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ABSTACT
Territorial privacy, one of the central categories of privacy protection, involves setting 
limit boundaries on intrusion into an explicit space or locale. Initially, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, which defined the privacy tort of intrusion, as applied by courts, most 
notably designated two classes of excluded areas: “private” places in which the   
individual can expect to be free from intrusion, and “non-private” places, in which the 
individual does not have a recognized expectation of privacy. In the physical world, 
courts ultimately held almost uniformly that the tort of intrusion could not occur in a 
public place or in a place that may be viewed from a public place.
Cyberspace, on the other hand, was not left with a public sphere nor has a balanced 
territorial privacy policy so far been established. Instead, based on the category of 
database privacy protection, only a private privacy legal rule was adopted and too 
widely so. One of the main explanations for this anomaly, in fact, derives from 
cyberspace’s unique architecture. While the physical world is subject to a default rule of 
a continuous public sphere that is then subject to distinct proprietary private sphere 
allotments; Cyberspace architecture, on the other hand, imbeds a different structure. In 
the latter, apart from the Internet’s “public roads” or backbone transit infrastructure, 
which is distinctly regulated according to telecommunications and antitrust law, the 
present default rule contains a mosaic of private allotments – namely, neighboring 
proprietary web sites.
This anomaly is even more acute given that the U.S government, the FTC and 
theoreticians alike, thus far, have developed neither comprehensive nor supportive 
boundary theory that could maintain territorial privacy. All three, instead, have implicitly 
or explicitly only considered technocentristic boundary approaches. From a legal 
perspective the factual truths or scientific hypothesis underlying the existence of on-line 
spatiality, as discussed notably in the works of Johnson and Post, Lessig, Hunter, Lemley 
and others, should, instead, be only a parameter in establishing legal truth. In 
compliance with what is an alternative localist boundary approach, this study suggests 
that law, indeed, could construct a legal fiction of on-line locales, through which 
territorial privacy, ultimately, could be integrated into cyberspace privacy policy at 
large.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
A.  Information privacy: The imperfect vision for computer-related privacy
Privacy has always been a challenging legal concept and is difficult to define.1 No bright 
line rule indicates whether an expectation of privacy is constitutionally reasonable.2 The 
concept of privacy has no single interest, but rather has several different dimensions or 
categories that are not just observed but also legally constructed. The concept of privacy 
can generally be divided into four categories.3 The first is bodily privacy, which 
addresses issues related to the physical integrity of the individual against invasive 
procedures through the tort of trespass to the person. Law, originally, provided a remedy 
solely for physical interference with the life and property of the individual.4 The second 
is privacy of communications, which relates to the First Amendment's freedom of speech 
and association, where an individual is granted the right to communicate freely among 
peers.5 It covers the various interests of individuals in communicating among themselves 
using various forms of communications. The third is information privacy, which concerns 
the control and handling of personal data.6 The constitutional right to information privacy 
is a derivative of the Supreme Court's substantive due process "right to privacy" cases 
such as Griswold v. Connecticut7 and Roe v. Wade.8 The fourth, and the focal point of 
* © 2004 Daniel Benoliel
** J.S.D. candidate UC Berkeley, School of Law & Internet Society Project (ISP) visiting Fellow, 
Yale Law School. This study was funded by the Informational Technology Research (ITR) 
research grant, University of California at Berkeley, The Center for Information Technology 
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For their most helpful comments and support, I am indebted to Pamela Samuelson, Mark Lemley, 
David Post, Dan Hunter, Julie Cohen, Edward Soja, Orin Kerr, the Chief Scientist of CITRIS -
James Demmel and David Wagner. Any inaccuracies are my responsibility. For further questions 
or comments, please email me at: Daniel_b@berkeley.edu. 
1 See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421, 422 (1980); Julie C. 
Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation 3 (1992); Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 34, 34 (1967); Raymond T. Nimmer, Information Law, Privacy Right vs. Public 
Right (November 2001), ¶ 8:31.
2 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987). See discussion herein.
3 See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Id, at 433; Joseph I. Rosenbaum, Privacy on the Internet: Whose 
Information is it Anyway?, 38 Jurimetrics 565, 566-67 (1998). See, discussion herein.
4 As early as 1891, the Supreme Court declared: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person”. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). See, also, Morris L. Ernst 
& Alan U. Schwartz, Privacy: The Right to Be Let Alone 47 (1962); Tom Gerety, Redefining 
Privacy, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 233 (1977), at 266 & n.119.
5 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001); U.S. v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th 
Cir. 1998); Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 216-17 (5th Cir. 2001).
6 Ruth Gavison, supra not 1, at 433; Posner defines it as an individual's "right to conceal 
discreditable facts about himself.” Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 46 (5th ed. 
1998); Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 272-73 (1981).
7 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
8 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In this landmark privacy case, the Court upheld that the right of privacy 
includes the right to make one's own decisions about activities related to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, abortion, family relationships, and education, or a subsidiary category of privacy, 
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this study, is territorial privacy, which involves setting limit boundaries on intrusion into 
an explicit space or locale.9 Turning our focus from disruptions to the practices, which 
they disrupt, we often refer to aspects of these practices as "private matters." In other 
words, we say that certain things, places, and affairs are “private.”10 Initially, Courts 
designated two classes of excluded areas: “private” areas, as a home,11 or a reserved hotel 
room,12 in which the individual can expect to be free from governmental intrusion13 and 
“non-private” areas, in which the individual does not have a recognized expectation of 
privacy.14 The designation of an area as “private” protected the personal information 
located there from intrusion and governmental seizure. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts most notably incorporated these views into the comments to section 652B, 15 which 
defines the privacy tort of intrusion.16 Thus, Courts held almost uniformly that the tort of 
intrusion could not occur in a public place or in a place that may be viewed from a public 
place.17 On a public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no legal right to 
known as ‘decisional privacy’. See, also, Whalen v. Roe 429 U.S. 589 (1977), where using a 
spatial metaphor, Court reaffirmed that constitutionally protected "zone of privacy" jointly 
protected he "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”, with the individual's 
"independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”. Id. at 599-600.
9 In boundary theory, the terms ‘space’, ‘locale’ and ‘sphere’ or ‘area’, have separate spatial 
meanings that would be distinguished later on. See discussion, in Part II, herein.
10 See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960), at 390-91; Daniel J. 
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, Calif. L. Rev. 1087 (2002), at 1130 [Hereinafter, ‘Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy’]. See, also, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 11-13, 75-77 (Norton ed. 1975) 
(emphasizing public and private locales).
11 Clinton v. Commonwealth, 130 S.E.2d 437 (Va. 1963), rev'd, Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 
(1964)).
12 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
13 Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
14 Id.
15 For an exception recognizing a cause of action of privacy intrusion in the public sphere, see, 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, (1977) (Intrusion Upon Seclusion) (Current through July 2002), § 
652B cmt. c., see, also, illus. 7.; 2. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964); 
Andrew Jay Mcclurg, Bringing privacy law out of the closet: A tort theory of liability for 
intrusions in public places, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 989 (1995), at 1045-1055 (upholding “public privacy” 
paradigm and a tortuous cause of action).
16 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B cmt. c. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B 
defines as a tort the intrusion into the seclusion of an individual. It is intended to protect against 
intrusions, physical or otherwise, "upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or 
concerns . . . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id. Courts in at 
least twenty-eight states and Federal Government have explicitly or implicitly recognize this 
privacy tort and adhere to the definitions offered in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B-
652E (1977). See, W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984), at 
851 (5th ed. 1984); Reporter’s Notes” for the list of practically all states and Federal Government 
upholding the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B Tort of Invasion.
17 See, also W. Page Keeton et al., Id, § 117, at 855-56; William L. Prosser, supra note 9, at 391-92; 
Andrew Jay Mcclurg, supra note 14, p. 1025; 86 A.L.R.3d 374, Taking Unauthorized Photographs 
as Invasion of Privacy (ed. Phillip E. Hassman), § 2. See, also e.g., Hartman v. Meredith Corp., 
638 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (D. Kan. 1986); Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 
1980); Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1116-17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); 
Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. 1963); Foster v. LivingWell Midwest, Inc., No. 88-
5340, 1988 WL 134497, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 1988); International Union v. Garner, 601 F. 
Supp. 187, 191 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (mem.).
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be alone;18 the circumstances themselves in such cases are not secluded,19 and it is not an 
invasion of her privacy to do no more than follow her about and watch her there.20
So far, the territorial facet of privacy has not been adequately applied to privacy in 
cyberspace since cyberspace is not a physical space and was poorly analogized to one.21
Instead, only a vision of information or database privacy has been proffered, in all three 
basic ways personal information can be digitally transmitted and collected from 
computers and over the Internet - through Web sites, personal computers and network 
service providers such as Internet service providers (ISPs). 
First and the focal point of this study, is privacy policy for website collection of personal 
data.22 Web sites collect personal data through cookies, registration forms, and 
sweepstakes that require surrendering e-mail addresses and other information.23 Other 
invasions of privacy relating to Web sites involve archives of comments made on the 
"Usenet"24 or to "list servs",25 and deceptive promises that Web sites sometimes make 
about privacy practices.26 Following with the U.S. Department of Health and Education"s 
18 W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 15, at 855 & n.68; 86 A.L.R.3d 374, id, § 2.
19 See, e.g., Granger v. Klein, 197 F. Supp. 2d 851 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (Publication in high school 
yearbook of photograph showing student urinating with his genitalia visible did not constitute 
intrusion into seclusion, under Michigan law, by school's principal, assistant principal, and 
yearbook advisor, and yearbook publisher, since they did not obtain photograph by objectionable 
means; photograph was snuck into photo collage by student's friend, and yearbook was edited by 
other students), Id.
20 W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 15, at 855 & n.68; 86 A.L.R.3d 374, supra note 16, § 2.
21 See, discussion at Part II.A.1-2, herein. 
22 For surveys supporting the wide spread practice of data collection by websites, see, e.g., 
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Surfer Beware: Personal Privacy and the Internet, at 
http://www.epic.org/reports/surfer-beware.html (suggesting that nearly half of the 100 most 
popular Web sites collected information from users); Fed Trade Comm’n, Self-regulation and 
privacy online: A report to Congress (July 1999) (hereinafter FTC Self-Regulation Report) 
(available at <www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9907/-report-1999.htm>, referring to Georgetown Internet 
Privacy Policy Survey <www.msb.edu/faculty/culnan/gippshome.html> (last visited 25 July 2004) 
(suggesting that up to eighty-five percent of Web sites collect personal information from 
consumers).
23 Michigan Law Revision Commission, Privacy and the Internet: A Study Report to the Michigan 
Law Revision Commission, Michigan Law Revision Commission Thirty-Fifth Annual Report, 
2000, at: http://www.milegislativecouncil.org/mlrc/2000/PrivacyandInternet.htm (Last visited July 
28 2004), at 22 [Hereinafter, ‘Michigan Law Revision Commission’].
24 Usenet allows participants to post communications into a database that others can access. See, Id, 
at 22.
25 List servs are listings of names and e-mail addresses that are grouped under a single name. See, Id, 
at 22.
26 Id. Some web surfing instructions may not be translated into sensory effects at all but instead 
direct the browser to take certain actions, such as changing the size of the window, opening a new 
window, or reloading the page after a given amount of time. See JavaScript Guide 
<http://developer.netscape.com/docs/manuals/communicator/jsguide4/index.htm>; An Exploration 
of Dynamic Documents, <http://home.netscape.com/assist/net_sites/pushpull.html>. In addition, 
web surfing takes other technical forms, such as, retrieving stored email files or sending outgoing 
email files, as both are web-based activities. See, Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's scope: Interpreting 
"Access" and "Authorization" in computer misuse statutes, 1596, N.Y.U. Law Rev. (2003), at 
CYBERSPACE CARTOGRAPHY
7
elaboration of the first computer information privacy policy in 1973.27 Strict information 
privacy protection for on-line environments was also adopted internationally by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1980.28 These guidelines 
were based on eight principles of information privacy: collection limitation, data quality, 
purpose specification, use limitation, transparency of information collection practices, 
security of stored data, individual participation, and accountability.29 In implementation 
of these principles, the Federal Trade Commission ultimately imported these guidelines’ 
information privacy orientation.30 It did so in outlining a set of Fair Information Practices 
(FIPs) regulating collection and use of consumer-oriented personal information by 
commercial web sites on the World Wide Web. 31 With the implementation of the
OECD’s privacy guidelines, the United States in fact has unequivocally chose to center 
its privacy policy around information or database policy regulating collection and use of 
personal information by commercial web sites.32
Second, in determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information stored in a computer, within its meaning in the Fourth Amendment, Courts 
have continuously treat the computer like a closed container such as a briefcase or file 
cabinet. Thus, again, adhering to information or database privacy.33 The most basic 
Fourth Amendment question in computer cases asks whether an individual enjoys a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic information stored within computers (or 
1648. These types of web surfing activities are, however, largely hidden from the user's 
perspective and typically do not require an independent surrendering of private information.
27 See, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Secretary's Advisory Comm. On Automated Personal 
Data Systems, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens (1973), reprinted in U.S. Privacy 
Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society, 15 n.7 (1977). See, 
also, Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 771 (1999), 773 & Fn. 9 and accompanying text [Hereinafter, ‘Reidenberg, Restoring 
Americans' Privacy’].
28 See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Recommendation of the Council 
Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data, in OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
14-16 (Sept. 23, 1980), available at http://www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/9302011E.pdf (last 
visited 25 July, 2004) [Hereinafter, ‘OECD Guidelines’].
29 Id, at Part II.
30 Id, Paragraph 19: National implementation, §§ 69-70.
31 See U.S. The Federal Trade Commission on "Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices In the 
Electronic Marketplace" (2000), at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/testimonyprivacy.htm#N_1_
(last visited July 25 2004) [Hereinafter, ‘FTC, Privacy Online’]. The FIPs have never been fully 
incorporated into U.S. law and merely remained a guiding source of law. For general discussion, 
see, Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy; Julie E. Cohen, DRM and privacy, 18 Berkeley 
Tech. & L.J. 575
32 Id, Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy, at 773-777 & accompanying notes (for the 
historical account in the U.S.). 
33 The Fourth Amendment is not applicable to private website data collectors, including users, as it 
"is wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private 
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the anticipation or knowledge of any 
governmental official." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (internal quotation 
omitted). Thus, the use of the Fourth Amendment 'expectation of privacy' standard should be used 
in analogy, or as explained in context.
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other electronic storage devices) under the individual's control, such as their laptop 
computers or floppy disks. As individuals generally retain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of closed containers, they also generally retain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in data held within electronic storage devices.34 Accordingly, 
accessing information stored in a computer ordinarily will implicate the owner's 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.35
Lastly, strict adherence to the category information privacy protection has been 
established in government-network service providers’ relations and searching and seizing 
computers and obtaining electronic evidence. In particular, Congress embedded this 
policy in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 198636 updating the 
Wiretap Act of 1968.37 ECPA regulates how the government can bind information 
privacy obtaining stored account data in a computer38 or financial record or file39 from 
network service providers such as ISPs.40 Such as, whenever agents or prosecutors seek 
stored e-mail, account records, or subscriber information from a network service.41
Specifically, it expanded the coverage of the Wiretap Act by adding information or 
database privacy protection through Title 1,42 addressing the unauthorized interception of 
computer databases or electronic communication43 while “in transit”, and Title 2,44
addressing the unauthorized acquisition of electronic communications while “in 
storage”.45 Overall, with several updates and expansions of the Wiretap Act, the ECPA 
34 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982).
35 See United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936-37 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (finding reasonable 
expectation of privacy in files stored on hard drive of personal computer); United States v. Reyes, 
922 F. Supp. 818, 832-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in data 
stored in a pager); United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284, 287 (D.V.I. 1995) (same); United 
States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (same); United States v. Blas, 1990 WL 
265179, at *21 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 4, 1990) (analogizing expectation of privacy "[I]n a pager, 
computer, or other electronic data storage and retrieval device as in a closed container.").
36 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), S. Rep. No. 99-541. 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 
(1986) at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555 (1986) (ECPA S. Rep.) and codified at 18 U.S.C 
§§ 2510-2541 (1988), citing United States v. New York Tel. Co. 434 U.S. 159, 167, 98 S.Ct. 364 
(1977).
37 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 and §§ 2701-10.
38 18 U.S.C. § 1030(1). Computer within its meaning in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) refers to a data 
storage facility.
39 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(a).
40 Other types of Network service providers are telephone companies, cell phone service providers, 
and satellite services. See, Department of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining 
Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations, at: 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm#_III_ (last visited July 28 2004), at Introduction 
[Hereinafter, DOJ Report].
41 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 creates statutory information privacy rights for customers and subscribers 
of computer network service providers. See, also, DOJ Report, at Part III.
42 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988). 
43 Electronic communications include telegraph, telex communications, electronic mail, nonvoice 
digitized transmissions, and the portion of video teleconferences that do not involve the hearing of 
voice or oral sounds. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1988), Id.
44 Id. 
45 Electronic storage includes computer random access memory, magnetic tapes, disks, magnetic and 
optical media, etc. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710 (1988), Id.
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became the predominant federal law protecting privacy through the category of 
information privacy in electronic communications from unauthorized interception, use 
and disclosure in all private network service providers, such as in cyberspace.46 As 
mentioned, this paper will focus on the first category of website data collection.
B. Territorial privacy: The missing category
In some situations the strict adherence to the category of information privacy provides 
incomplete privacy solutions for website-related data collection practices. In such 
situation, arguably, the integration of the category of territorial privacy should be 
justified, in some analogy to physical world privacy protection. Largely put, the 
limitations of strictly adhering to the category of information privacy are fourfold and 
relate to: (1) the confusion concerning information privacy protection in multiple or 
mixed files; (2) the sequential and fast-moving usage of files in website navigation, as 
opposed to static data exchange in single databases; (3) the proprietary-based subject 
matter of the exception "available to the public" within its meaning in § 2511(2)(g)(i) at 
ECPA; and (4) the added value of territorial segregation of on-line areas to the 
heterogeneity of data collection and consumers choice.
First, even though courts have largely approved that electronic storage devices can be 
analogized to closed containers for Fourth Amendment purposes, they have reached 
contradictory conclusions over whether each digital file stored on a computer or disk 
should be treated as a separate closed container, subject to a single Fourth Amendment 
procedure. Thus on the one hand, courts held that a computer disk containing multiple 
files is a single container. For example, in United States v. Runyan,47 in which private 
parties had searched certain files and found child pornography, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the police did not exceed the extent of the private search when they examined 
supplementary files on any disk that had been, in part, privately searched.48 Similarly, in 
United States v. Slanina,49 the court held that when a warrantless search of a portion of a 
computer and zip disk had been justified, the defendant no longer retained any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the remaining contents of the computer and disk, 
and thus a comprehensive search by law enforcement personnel did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.50 These solutions, however, did not suggest a coherent substantive 
legal policy.51 In similar cases, instead, courts refused to comply with this broad 
interpretative approach. Thus, for example, in contradiction to the Fifth Circuit's 
46 Interception of communications made outside the United States, however, is not within the scope 
of ECPA, while U.S. interstate communications “affecting interstate of foreign commerce” are 
included. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1988), Id.
47 275 F.3d 449, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2001).
48 Id. at 464.
49 283 F.3d 670, 680 (5th Cir. 2002).
50 Id.
51 Although courts do see such multiplicity as a concerning phenomenon, as a procedural matter, 
however, evidence acquired from a network search that accessed data stored in multiple districts 
should not lead to suppression unless the agents intentionally and deliberately disregarded Rule 
41(a) (Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a)) or prejudice resulted. See generally United States v. Trost, 152 F.3d 
715, 722 (7th Cir. 1998).
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approach, Tenth Circuit cases consistently have refused to allow such exhaustive 
searches of a computer's hard in the absence of a warrant or some exception to the 
warrant requirement.52 Particularly, the Tenth Circuit cautioned in a later case that 
"[b]ecause computers can hold so much information touching on many different areas of 
a person's life, there is greater potential for the 'intermingling' of documents and a 
consequent invasion of privacy when police execute a search for evidence on a 
computer".53 Throughout the Internet, very large web sites may be spread over a number 
of servers in different geographic locations.54 IBM is a good example; its Web site 
consists of thousands of files spread out over many servers in world-wide locations 
further defying the analogy between a file and a single container. Moreover, today, one 
can have multiple web sites that cross-link to files on each others' sites or even share the 
same files.55 These developments challenge even the Privacy Act's56 broad file-based 
definition of a "record about an individual" as "any item, collection, or grouping of 
information about an individual,"57 for the case of complex websites.
In continuation, arguably, this latter interpretative approach is becoming more acute, as 
the structure of websites and navigation through their files has become more sequential 
and fast-moving, as opposed to static data exchange in single files or databases.58 As 
surfing speed, websites and servers complexity and size - all increase navigation 
afforded by windows, menus, dialogue areas, control panels, etc. Thus, this 
technological progress should, in fact, imply a processional understanding of web 
navigation through sequences of content, as opposed to earlier structural file search, 
dominant in the dissimilar physical world.59
Third, information privacy is also limited within the scope of ECPA's privacy exception 
concerning files that are "available to the public" within its meaning in paragraph 
2511(2)(g)(i).60 This section permits "any person" to intercept an electronic 
communication made through a system "that is configured so that . . . [the] 
52 See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273-75 (10th Cir. 1999) (ruling that agent exceeded 
the scope of a warrant to search for evidence of drug sales at the point where he "abandoned that 
search" and started searching for evidence of child pornography for five hours).
53 United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001). 
54 See, searchWebServices.com (‘web site’) 
http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci541370,00.html (Defining a web 
site as a related collection of World Wide Web (WWW) files that includes a beginning file called 
a home page).
55 Id.
56 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
57 Id. § 552a(a)(4). The Privacy Act, despite notable flaws, represents the most comprehensive 
attempt to structure information processing within the public sector and applies, however, only to 
federal agencies.
58 See, Aaron Marcus, "Principles of Effective Visual Communication for Graphical User Interface 
Design," Readings in Human-Computer Interaction (2nd Ed.), Ed. Baecker, Grudin, Buxton, and 
Greenberg, Morgan Kaufman, Palo Alto, 1995, at. 425-441. ISBN: 1-55860-246-1; Aaron Marcus, 
"Metaphor Design in User Interfaces," The Journal of Computer Documentation, ACM/SIGDOC, 
Vol. 22:2 (1998), at. 43-57.
59 Id. 
60 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
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communication is readily accessible to the general public."61 This exception has not yet 
been applied by the courts in any published cases concerning computers. This exception 
is primarily defined with respect to radio communications in proposed section 210(16) of 
title 18.62 Such 'public' communications would include the stereo subcarrier used in FM 
broadcasting or data carried on the VBI to provide closed-captioning of TV programming 
for the hearing-impaired.63 Thus, radio services readily accessible to the general public 
are exempt from this act's prohibitions against interception by the generic exception 
contained in paragraph 2511(2)(g)(i).64
Potentially, its language could permit the interception of an electronic communication 
that has been posted to a public bulletin board, a public chat room, or a Usenet 
newsgroup.65 Yet such understanding of the paragraph is still subject to several 
difficulties. To begin with, the subject matter of that availability does not relate to a 
private place or locale but, again, to a file or a computer. Thus, the same difficulties 
described above remain present. Moreover, services are available to the public are a 
"remote computing service", as under the definition provided by § 2711(2), a service can 
only be a "remote computing service" if it is available "to the public." From a third party 
off-site computer that stores information for a customer.66 This definition does not deal 
however with electronic communications that are not remote computing services, such as 
in the case of peer-to-peer communications. In addition, availability to the public such as 
within its meaning in § 2702(a) assumes that services are available to the public if they 
are available to any user who complies with the requisite procedures and pays any 
requisite fees. Yet, thus far, ECPA's definition of "public" excludes providers whose 
services are open only to those with a special relationship with the provider, such as 
employers who provide network accounts only to employees.67 A territorial privacy 
analysis instead, may in fact recognize public places even within privately provided 
websites.68 Thus, while overriding the proprietary-based dependency on baseline 
entitlements of services' owners and users.69 Lastly, ECPA's present interpretation of 
61 Id.
62 See, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3572.
63 Id.
64 Id, at 3573.
65 See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 36 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3590 (discussing 
bulletin boards). 
66 The term "remote computing service" (RCS) means the provision to the public of computer 
storage or processing services by an off-site computer that stores or processes data for a customer. 
See S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564-65. For example, a 
service provider that processes data in a time-sharing arrangement provides an RCS. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 99-647, at 23 (1986).
67 See Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (ruling that an 
internal e-mail system that was made available to a hired contractor but was not available to "any 
member of the community at large" is excluded from the public). 
68 For further analogy with the physical world with application to websites, see Part III.C.1.a.2, infra.
69 See, also, United States v. Gorshkov, 2001 WL 1024026, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001) 
(ruling that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in use of a private 
computer network when undercover federal agents looked over his shoulder, when he did not own 
the computer he used). Nor will individuals generally enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of computers they have stolen. See United States v. Lyons, 992 F.2d 1029, 1031-32 
(10th Cir. 1993).
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availability "to the public" raises a difficulty concerning the dependent definition of 
'intercept'. Such as when the seizure of a computer on which is stored private E-mail that 
has been sent to an electronic bulletin board, but not yet read (retrieved) by the 
recipients, constitutes an 'intercept' proscribed by § 2511(1)(a).70 In such conflict, a 
territorially based analysis would have maintained that even when control over the 
communication remains at the hand of the sender, the private communication 
nevertheless belongs to the public sphere by a question of its mere location (once it has 
been posted), overriding the question of whether such communication was later on 
intercepted.71
Fourth, the category of information privacy may generate only a sub-optimal added value 
from territorial segregation of heterogeneous on-line areas, preventing distinct data 
collection practices and consumers' navigation choices. Consequently, as Tiebout’s well-
known theorem all-purposely predicts, the further allocation of legal rights to different 
types of territorial locales, predominantly private and public, would exercise strong 
effects upon the heterogeneity of data collection practices, justifying the geographical 
variation of on-line privacy rules altogether.72 In the physical world, Tiebout's theorem is 
widely used to explain the demand curve economic causes of urban spatial segregation. 
Using a system of decentralized provision of public good such as privacy through self-
regulated websites owners, consumers would be required to reveal their true preference 
for different amounts of the privacy in the form of their own personal demand curve for 
whole websites or separate areas in them. As Tiebout describes “Spatial mobility 
provides the local public goods counterpart to the private market’s shopping trip.”73
Tiebout’s thinking points to a clustering effect in which users of very similar demands for 
the local public good naturally would then choose to subsist in the same on-line 
community. In cyberspace, such segregated on-line territorial areas would then be backed 
by different privacy policies, specifically private and public territorial privacy policies, 
competing with websites owner's offering only information privacy instead. 
To conclude, the added value of on-line territorial privacy must be carefully considered.  
As would be explained, it would legitimate observance and non-identifiable data 
collection in an on-line public locale or in a locale that may be viewed from a public 
one. Notably, with regard to databases, much information collection and use occurs in 
what would otherwise be considered public, and, indeed, many parts of cyberspace may 
well be considered public locales.74 A chat room, for example, can be maintained as 
70 See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460. In support of the general interception standard, see also, 
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184 ("[A]n e-mail message . . . cannot be afforded a reasonable 
expectation of privacy once that message is received."). But see C. Ryan Reetz, Note, Warrant 
Requirement for Searches of Computerized Information, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 179, 200-06 (1987) 
(arguing that certain kinds of remotely stored computer files should retain Fourth Amendment 
protection, and attempting to distinguish United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland).
71 For further analogy with the physical world with application to websites,, see Part III.C.1.A, infra.
72 Id.
73 Id, at 422.
74 See, e.g., Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 30, at 1433. See, also, discussion in Part III.B.2, 
infra.
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either a Web site or part of a Web site.75 With lack of sufficient clarity, even potential 
public locales, such as chat rooms, are presently under regulated, lacking privacy policy 
precision.76
The absence of self-regulation or new legislation integrating territorial privacy already 
brings into question the extent to which website owners will seek to shield themselves 
from liability for deceptive practices by not establishing a privacy policy in the first 
instance. The FTC's enforcement action against GeoCities highlights the leaky privacy 
protection offered by websites.77 GeoCities markets itself as a "virtual community" 
that organizes its members' home pages into forty different areas, termed 
"neighborhoods."  In these areas, members can post a personal Web page, receive e-mail, 
and participate in chat rooms. Non-members can also visit many areas of GeoCities. 
According to the FTC, GeoCities engaged in two kinds of deceptive practices in 
connection with its collection and use of personal information. First, although GeoCities 
promised a limited use of the data it collected, it in fact sold, rented, and otherwise 
disclosed this information to third parties who used it for purposes well beyond the scope 
of permission given by individuals. At no point, however, was this practice recognized in 
what would otherwise been acknowledged as GeoCities's public locale. Second, 
GeoCities promised that it would be responsible for maintenance of the data collected 
from children in the "Enchanted Forest" part of its Web site. Instead, it turned such 
personal information over to third parties called "community leaders." That activity could 
have been made legitimate, by considering or allowing the construction of that part of its 
website as public. Finally, GeoCities settled with the FTC and promised to make 
75 See, searchWebServices.com (‘Chat room’) 
http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci541370,00.html (last visited July. 
20, 2004).
76 See Am. Online, Inc., AOL Instant Messenger Web Chat Rules & Etiquette, at 
http://www.aol.com/community/rules.html (last visited July. 20, 2004) (containing a murky list of 
web chat rules and etiquette: “When communicating in a chat room be mindful that many people 
will be able to view it and the inclusion of information such as your name, your address or 
telephone number is never recommended.”…“It's also a good rule-of-thumb to check the Privacy 
Policies of any unfamiliar or new web sites you visit.”). Then, see also, Am. Online, Privacy 
Policy, http://www.aol.com/info/privacy.adp (last visited July. 20, 2004) (ignoring the public 
nature of chat rooms, while over inclusively stating "This privacy policy applies to the AOL.com 
site”). See, also, Yahoo's privacy policy available at: http://privacy.yahoo.com (last visited July. 
20, 2004) (same). See, additionally, United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 
1997) (denying a reasonable expectation of privacy in a chat room providing that defendant is 
made aware of the operating procedures in that chat room); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 
406, 419 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (mentioning in dicta "[m]essages sent to the public at large in the 'chat 
room' . . . lose any semblance of privacy").
77 See GeoCities, File No. 9823015 (Fed. Trade Comm. 1998) (agreement containing consent order). 
The GeoCities Consent Order can also be found at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/-9808/geo-ord.htm>. For a discussion, see FTC, Analysis of 
Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment <www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/9823015.-
ana.htm>. The GeoCities Web site is located at <http://www.geocities.com>. The FTC was able to 
obtain jurisdiction in this case only because GeoCities' false representations regarding its privacy 
practices constituted "deceptive acts or practices" within the meaning of under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.
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significant changes in its privacy practices.78 The final order permits GeoCities to collect 
or use personal data about children to the extent permitted by the Children's Online 
Privacy Protection Act of 1998.79 Again, this is while ignoring the possibility of 
recognizing a separate privacy policy for a public part of its website. 
The value of integrating on-line territorial privacy, nevertheless, is not comparable for all 
types of data collected: Currently, there are two basic ways used by websites to collect 
such non-content personal information.80 The first is by directly collecting information 
from users (“registration” and “transactional” data).81 Registration data is collected by 
those websites that request users to log in order to access parts of the website. In 
reference to ECPA's definitions, Registration data can be seen as "Basic subscriber 
information" within its meaning at paragraph 2703(c)(2).82 A second type of data that 
collected directly by websites is transactional data. It is gleaned by websites engaging in 
business with users, such as selling merchandise or services.83 In reference to ECPA's 
§ 2703(c)(1), transactional data relates to "a record or other information pertaining to a 
subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of 
communications)." The broad definition of this category seems to comprise of all records 
that are not contents, including basic subscriber information.
The second way through which websites collect data is indirect, by tracking the way 
people navigate through the Internet (“clickstream” data), it enables the website to 
calculate how many times it has been visited and what parts are the most popular.84 It 
may be seen to include also information revealed by uniquely distinguishing features of a 
user's computer, such as the unique serial numbers contained in Intel's Pentium III 
78 See GeoCities Proposed Consent Agreement, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,624  (1998) (final approval Feb. 12, 
1999); FTC, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively Collecting Personal 
Information in Agency's First Internet Privacy Case <www.ftc.gov/-opa/1998/9808/geocitie.htm>.
79 See Jeffrey P. Cunard, Jennifer B. Coplan & George Vradenburg, III, Communications Law 1999, 
581 PLI/Pat 853 (Nov. 1999).
80 There is also "Contents" within its meaning at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(8), 2703(c)(1) in ECPA. The 
contents of a network account are the actual files stored in the account. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). 
In practice, however, website owners do not typically collect 'contents'. Alternatively, this type of 
data collection may limit user's 'communications privacy' (see Part I.A), whenever it is collected 
by other users. See, also discussion, herein.
81 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and power: Computer databases and metaphors for information privacy, 
53 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, at 1411 [Hereinafter, ‘Solove, Privacy and Power’].
82 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) lists the categories of basic subscriber information: (A) name; (B) address; 
(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and 
durations; (D) length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized; (E) telephone 
or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned 
network address; and (F) means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card 
or bank account number)[.]. In general, the items in this list recount the identity of a subscriber, 
but for ECPA's purposes, also his association with his ISP, and his basic session connection 
records. The PATRIOT Act enhanced the categories of basic subscriber information in three 
respects. See PATRIOT Act § 210, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001). It added "records of session times 
and durations," as well as "any temporarily assigned network address" to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2); 
Lastly, the "means and source of payment" that a customer uses to pay for an account, "including 
any credit card or bank account number." 
83 Solove, Privacy and Power, Id.
84 Solove, Privacy and Power, Id.
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chips.85 As this paper argues, database protection against such forms of information 
collection, but particularly registration data that is collected upon initial entry to 
databases, is an overly generalized and thus over inclusive privacy category.86 It 
implicitly includes both possible public and private on-line locales, while overly 
protecting the former. 
Lastly on-line territorial privacy, arguably, should not categorically replace on-line 
information privacy but, whenever necessary and possible, complement it. In the physical 
world, courts have, in fact, rejected cases involving territorial intrusion whenever privacy 
infringed was done in databases and would therefore belong to the category of 
information or database privacy, such as, while rejecting obtaining a person's unlisted 
phone number,87 the selling subscription lists to direct mail companies,88 or the collecting 
and disclosing an individual's past insurance history.89 Constructing a similar balance 
within cyberspace, therefore, would not be unprecedented.
C.  Constructing on-line territoriality: The argument's structure 
In analogy to the physical world, the suggested adaptation of territorial privacy to 
cyberspace based on the tort of intrusion upon seclusion will overcome many of these 
anomalies. Notably it would prevail over the obstacles left by the doctrine of trespass to 
chattels, commonly referred to in access policy cases in cyberspace.90 Particularly, 
territorial privacy and private and public locales, more specifically, could coexist on the 
Internet, just as they do in the physical world.91 Courts may then be required to 
85 See, Michigan Law Revision Commission, Privacy and the Internet: A Study Report to the  
Michigan Law Revision Commission, Michigan Law Revision Commission
Thirty-Fifth Annual Report, 2000, available at:
http://www.milegislativecouncil.org/mlrc/2000/PrivacyandInternet.htm (Last visited July 28 
2004), at 15).
86 Definitions of database or equivalent terms in proposed U.S. legislation, such as the Consumer and 
Investor Access Bill, have been a little more detailed. See, H.R. 1858 §101(1). See, also, 
Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing private rights and public reconceptualizing property in databases, 
Berkeley Tech. Law J. 773 (2003).
87 Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
88 Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
89 Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1978).
90 Under the alternative doctrine of trespass to chattels, an actor can commit a trespass to chattels by 
using or intermeddling with a chattel only if it is in the possession of another. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 217(b) (1965). See, also, Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political 
Activity on Private Lands, Id, at 655 (similarly arguing for the physical world). Further on, while 
trespass to chattels can represent the civil branch of the unauthorized access cases, it does not 
focus on the privacy of the data subject per se. Rather, it focuses on the concept of intrusion into a 
protected area that is different than access to the data subject or appropriation of the information 
gathered. See, e.g., Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as 
Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1, 26-41 (1996), at 61.
91 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, 
Emissions Trades and Ecosystems, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 129, 154 (1998); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy 
and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1609, 1657 (1999), at 1664 (adding to the public 
and private also the quasi-public locale), at 1667. Notwithstanding the importance of the latter 
CYBERSPACE CARTOGRAPHY
16
differentiate and identify public locales and then fence them out from private ones. Thus 
far, cyberspace has not been left with public locales, nor has a balanced territorial privacy 
policy been established. Instead, only a private, and too wide, privacy legal rule has been 
adopted. In continuation to previous jurisprudential developments, privacy should 
continue to be revalued instrumentally.92 Ultimately, a legal fiction of on-line locales 
should now be constructed for cyberspace’s overall privacy policy.93 For such legal 
fiction to be effectively applicable and harmonious with privacy protection at large, a 
comprehensive boundary framework for cyberspace has to first be agreed upon, as 
explained in Parts II-VI, in the following order.
Part II provides with an overview of the two competing boundary approaches for 
cyberspace. Arguably, thus far, cyberspace is still left without a comprehensive boundary 
approach and Courts or legislators have not yet been successful in collectively adopting 
one. In theory, however, cyberspace boundary discourse is, nevertheless, present, and has 
thus far only given rise to two conflicting approaches, referred to herein as the ‘globalist’ 
and the ‘anti-globalist,’ while largely ignoring the more sensible legal alternative – one 
based on a ‘localist’ boundary approach, which will be critically assessed in this part. 
The first, therefore, is the globalist boundary theory approach. It is a rather optimistic 
technologically-oriented analysis, which suggests that cyberspace is bound to be zoned 
similarly to the physical world, although separate on-line spatiality does not exist, 
according to Lessig or Shapiro, most notably; or that spatiality exists separately from the 
physical world and might allow some degree of zoning, according to Johnson and Post. In 
both ways, spatiality is seen merely as a technological constraint that, in fact, could 
override the legal understanding of spatiality. In essence, both are looking for a 
technological solution and, in fact, underestimate the role of law in erecting boundaries in 
cyberspace. Both, therefore, uphold two competing versions of a globalist boundary 
theory for cyberspace. The second approach could be seen as an antithesis to the globalist 
approach, in the face of an anti-globalist boundary theory for cyberspace. Among its 
supporters are Hunter, Lemley and others who also focus their spatial analysis on the 
technological regulative constraint. Their message largely rejects the spatial analogy 
category, and in compliance with the tort of intrusion jurisprudence, I will ignore the latter 
category. See, also, discussion, herein.
92 See, also, Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 9, at 1144-1145; Julie C. Inness, supra note 
1, at 95. One example is the Court's 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438 
(1928) epitomizes the need for interpretive flexibility in constructing privacy. The Court held that 
the wiretapping of a person's home telephone (done outside a person's house) did not run afoul of 
the Fourth Amendment because it did not involve a trespass inside a person's home, Id. at 465.
Only in 1967, overruling Olmstead did the Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967) hold 
construct that wiretapping does not necessitate physical trespass. See, also, Carl Shapiro & Hal R. 
Varian, U.S. Government Information Policy 45 (July 30, 1997)
<http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/policy/policy.html#SECTION0008100000000000000
0> (Section on Privacy) (last visited 25 July 004).
93 See generally, also, Andrew L. Shapiro, Street Corners in Cyberspace, The Nation, July 3, 1995 
(in justification of the 1st Amendment "public forum” doctrine); David J. Goldstone, a Funny 
Thing Happened on The Way To The Cyber Forum: Public v. Private in Cyberspace Speech, 69 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (Winter 1998), at 3 (same). See, also discussion, herein.
CYBERSPACE CARTOGRAPHY
17
between the physical space and cyberspace; as Cyberspace is not a real ‘place’, but 
instead is a medium as tangible objects do not exist "there”.94
Geared with the motivation to find and legalize their underlying scientific truths, both the 
globalist and anti-globalist approaches share a tendency to over-scientize the law in those 
instances when science and law interact, as then can be applied through the case of on-
line territorial privacy protection. Arguably, both approaches do not seem to have 
appropriately dealt with challenge to their scientific or hypothetical truths, which they 
assume, nor do they seem to have adequately confronted the constructive legal 
implications of an altogether contending localist boundary theory for cyberspace. Legal 
truth, such as the one suggested for the formalization of on-line spatiality, should then, in 
fact, be a tentative scientific truth transformed from mere scientific truths, backed by 
legal values, to an inclusive legal truth by courts or other regulating institutions. 
As would be reminded, Anglo-American jurisprudence has a long record of viewing 
factual or scientific truth as only one parameter in establishing legal truth. The factual or 
scientific validity of spatial or non-physical boundaries, therefore, should not inherently 
serve as a binding constraint on a possible legal formation of on-line locales. In 
continuation, areal or local differentiation should now replace the homogenous spatial 
organization as the major conceptual focus of cyberspace’s globalist boundary theory. 
Consequently, the allocation of legal rights to different types of locales, predominantly 
private and public, may then exercise strong effects upon the heterogeneity of data 
collection practices, justifying the geographical variation of on-line privacy rules 
altogether. 
Part III, consequently, upholds that law may indeed construct a legal fiction of on-line 
locales. Seen through the prism of the cumulative characteristics of legal fictions, this 
chapter confronts both globalist and anti-globalist boundary rationales, in support of the 
comprehensive theoretical structure of localist boundary application to law at large. 
Ultimately, this part applies the construction of a legal fiction of on-line locales to 
territorial privacy as part of cyberspace’s overall privacy policy.
Part IV deduces several policy rationales concerning the prospect of integrating territorial
privacy in cyberspace. It concludes by suggesting that notwithstanding the category of 
information privacy protection, territorial privacy upon cyberspace’s private and public 
locales, more specifically, could coexist on the Internet, similarly to the physical world. 
Courts may then be required to differentiate and identify public locales and then fence 
them out from private ones. 
94 See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as place and the tragedy of the digital anticomons, 91 Cal. L. 
Rev. 439 (2003), at 472; Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 521 (2003), at 
523; Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 217, at 217; 
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an 
Appropriate Analogy, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 561 (2001), at 567 [Hereinafter, ‘O'Rourke, Property 
Rights’]. 
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II.
CYBERSPACE BOUNDARY DISCOURSE: THE TWO APPROACHES
In the quest for exercising regulatory or judicial jurisdiction in the physical sphere, the 
Anglo-American legal system traditionally requires the establishment of a ‘geographic 
nexus’--the connection required to give an individual or government a legitimate interest 
in a legal controversy in a given ‘locale’.95 In terms of political geography, it is largely 
agreed that any boundary theory consists of the attributes of such locales in space (points, 
lines, or areas) and the interactions, or nexus, between these locations.96 In this sense, 
space is the conceptualization of the imagined physical relationships, which gives 
meaning to society.97 Locale, on the other hand, is the distinct space that encompasses 
both the idea and the actuality of where things are.98 Referring to the nested hierarchy of 
bounded spaces of differing size, such as the local, regional, national and global, is a 
familiar and taken-for-granted concept of political geographers and political analysts.99
Thus, numerous scholars have employed a framework that employs three scales of 
analysis – international or global, national or state level, and an intra-national, usually an 
urban metropolitan scale.100 They are relatively closed and self-sufficient systems.101
Incorporated also into the physical world’s legal discourse, two main competing 
interpretive border theories, thus far, have developed: A globalist and a localist, each, as 
will be explained, insufficiently attentive to the values represented by the other.102 They 
pivot around the basic unit of the state- hence the international, national and intra-
95 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Stretching The Margins: The Geographic Nexus in Environmental 
Law, Stan. L. Rev. 1247 (1996), at 1247, 1273-1275 (in application to international environmental 
law); Christopher D. Stone, Locale and Legitimacy in International Environmental Law, Stan. L. 
Rev. 1279 (1996) (same).
96 For matters of convenience, the terms ‘locale’ and ‘location’ would be used correspondingly. 
Edward W. Soja, A paradigm for the geographical analysis of political systems (1974), 43-71, In 
Locational approaches to power and conflict, Kevin R. Cox, David Reynolds & Stein Rekkan 
(Eds.), at 53 [Hereinafter, ‘Soja, A paradigm’]; R.J. Johnson, spatial structures (Mathuen: London, 
1973), p. 14; Hence Short, An introduction to political geography (Routledge & Kegan Paul: 
London, 1982) 1; David Delaney & Helga Leitner, The political construction of scale, Political 
Geography, Vol. 16 No. 2, 93 (1997), at 93. 
97 M. Keith & S. Pile, (eds.), Place and Politics of identity (London Routledge, 1993); A. Gupta, 
Blurred boundaries: The discourse of corruption, The culture of politics, and the imagined state, 
American Ethnologist vol. 22, no. 2 (1992), at 375-402.
98 Id, at 375-402.
99 David Delaney & Helga Leitner, supra note 45, at 93.
100 See, e.g., Peter Tylor, Political geography: world-economy, nation-state and locality (Longman 
Scientific & technical, 1993), p. 43.
101 R.J. Johnson, supra note 45, at 14.
102 Hastings Donnan & Thomas M. Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State (Berg, 
1999), at 9; Daniel A. Farber, supra note 44, at 1247, 1248, 1270-1271 (investigating the conflict 
between localist and global perspectives in environmental law); Edward Soja, Surveying Law and 
Borders – Afterward, Stan. L. Rev. 1421 (1996), at 1426 (same) [Hereinafter, ‘Soja, Surveying 
Law and Borders’]; Soja, A paradigm, supra note 45, at 53. 
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national terminology.103 The first is a spatial analysis, which refers to globalist boundary 
theory as has been adopted, for instance, in international environmental or even criminal 
law. Globalism gives every government an equally legitimate concern with every issue, 
without offering any line drawing rationale, and, in that sense, attempts to erase 
geographic discontinuity. The basic idea of globalism is that legal controversies know no 
territorial boundaries.104 What happens in one place affects everyone everywhere, and no 
particular geographic nexus should be required as a basis for legal action.105 According to 
the globalist approach, geographical uniformity is not an inevitable feature of a legal 
rule.106
The second is an areal analysis, which refers to localist boundary theory. Localism tends 
to place talismanic weight on physical location and presence as its core concern.107 At the 
international level, localism is surely the baseline.108 An individual physically present in a 
locale has a cognizable interest in it, just as governments have a legitimate interest in 
threats that are physically present within their territories.109 The perception that objective 
physical conditions vary from locale to locale may then lead rule makers to pursue a 
consistent and comprehensive legal policy by adopting different localized legal rules, 
based on respective distinctive jurisdictions. Arguably, thus far, cyberspace is still left 
without an applicable boundary approach and Courts or legislators have successfully 
adopted none. In theory, however, cyberspace boundary discourse is, nevertheless, 
present, and has thus far only given rise to two conflicting approaches, globalist and anti-
globalist, while largely ignoring the more sensible legal alternative – one based on a 
localist boundary approach, which will be critically assessed herein.
Thus far, the regulative debate regarding the question of spatiality in cyberspace has 
primarily presented contradicting approaches towards globalist boundary theory. The first 
is a basic globalist boundary approach. Its' rather optimistic, technologically-oriented 
analysis suggests that cyberspace is bound to be zoned similarly to the physical world, 
although separate on-line spatiality does not exist, according to scholars like Lessig or 
Shapiro, most notably, or that spatiality exists separately and might allow some degree of 
zoning, according to Johnson and Post. In both ways, spatiality is merely seen as a 
technological constraint that overrides any legal definition of spatiality. Thus, in 
agreement with Johnson and Post, Lessig predicts that in cyberspace the game is 
becoming code. Law is a sideshow. Thus, this technological primacy is more than a 
difference in efficiency.110 In essence, both are looking for a technological solution, 
103 See, e.g., Peter Tylor, supra note 49, at. 44.
104 See, also, Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997) (stating 
for the context of cyberspace "The Internet has no territorial boundaries"), at 462. See, also, 
discussion in Part II.A, infra.
105 See, Daniel A. Farber, supra note 44, at 1272.
106 See, Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, Stan. L. Rev. 1197 (1996), at 1201.
107
 Daniel A. Farber, supra note 44, at 1270; Soja, A paradigm, supra note 45, at 53.
108 Daniel A. Farber, Id, at 1270; Soja, A paradigm, Id, at 53.
109 Id, Daniel A. Farber, at 1270.
110 L. Lessig, The Constitution of Code: Limitations on Choice—Based Critiques of Cyberspace 
Regulation, 181 (1997), at 182; L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, (basic books, 
1999), at 130 [Hereinafter, ‘Lessig, Code and Other Laws’].
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which arguably underestimate the role of law. Both, overall, uphold two competing 
versions of a globalist boundary approach for cyberspace. The second approach stands as 
an antithesis to the former and could be seen as an anti-globalist boundary approach. 
Among its supporters are Hunter, Lemley and others who also focus their spatial analysis 
on the technological regulative constraint. Nevertheless, their rather skeptical inclination 
is to argue that technology has in fact, failed to create substantive on-line spatiality and 
none can be put in its place. As will be briefly described herein, both the globalist and the 
anti-globalist approaches alike do not seem to appropriately have dealt with challenge to 
the underlying scientific or hypothetical truths which they assume, nor do they seem to 
have adequately confronted the constructive legal implications of an altogether 
contending localist boundary theory for cyberspace.
A. Globalist boundary theory: Johnson & Post and Lessig
Until the digital era, there has been a general correspondence between borders drawn in 
physical space (between nation states or other political entities) and their conceptual 
definitions in what Johnson and Post allegorically call "law space”.111 Nowadays, 
cyberspace is dealing with a genuine fencing challenge with ‘law space’, or, more simply, 
law, needing to correspond to non-physical jurisdictions. Consequently, cyberspace is 
experiencing a conflict between different boundary theory traditions that affects its 
culture and development.112 Thus far, application of cyberspace globalist boundary 
theory, notably, focuses not on whether fencing in or fencing out is more appropriate for 
some aspect of cyberspace, but whether there could and should be fences at all and, in 
some cases, whether law has the legitimacy to erect them.
In compliance with the acute technologically oriented approach that focuses on the 
technological reality as the main constraint, Courts seemed to have generally followed 
this technocentristic line of argumentation. That choice was ultimately encapsulated in 
the constituting case of Reno v. ACLU,113 where the Court concluded that the Internet 
was deserving of full First Amendment protection, not the lesser protection afforded to 
broadcast media. In so doing, the Court considered how well each metaphor actually 
applied cyberspace. The court concluded that cyberspace allowed the construction of 
barriers and their use to screen for identity, making cyberspace more like the physical 
world and, consequently, more amenable to zoning laws.114 Justice O'Connor's opinion 
makes that very controversial assumption, observing "[c]yberspace undeniably reflects 
some form of geography; chat rooms and Web sites, for example, exist at fixed 'locations' 
on the Internet”.115
111 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1367 (1996), at 1368 [Hereinafter, ‘Johnson & Post’].
112 Jonathan J. Rusch, Cyberspace and the “Devil’s Hatband,” 24 Seattle U. L. Rev. 577, 591-92 
(2000), at 585.
113 See, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
114 Id, at 2354.
115 See, 117 S. Ct. at 2353 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
For opposing opinions in few lower instances, see, e.g., American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. 
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Nevertheless, the major difficulty with this strict comparison between cyberspace and the 
physical world is the line of argument which suggests that the aggregate existence of 
distinctive locales implies a globalist boundary notion of continuous spatiality, whether in 
connection with the physical world or not. In other words, if we recognize that 
cyberspace is constituted by locales in which a variety of interactions may occur, one 
must think about the spatial relationship among them. 
This technologically oriented view of at least physical-virtual continuous spatiality, 
upheld by the Supreme Court has also gained itself popularity among the academic 
community. The works of Lawrence Lessig, Andrew Shapiro, Trotter Hardy, and 
others are perhaps those that most paved the way in that direction. In compliance with 
the Court’s continuity choice, unlike Johnson and Post, who argue for a separation 
between real space law and Cyberspace law, Lessig, most notably, does not believe that 
it can be sustained or that it should be.116
Putting much faith in technology at the expense of a weakened legal approach, Lessig 
promises us “what is missing in discourse about Cyberspace and its regulation is a richer 
understanding of the range of architectures that are possible”.117 The architecture of 
Cyberspace, we are told, will in principle allow for perfect zoning--a way to perfectly 
exclude those who would cross boundaries.118 Advances in technology, not law, we are 
told, will make zoning the Internet feasible in the future.119
Overall, Lessig and Hardy and others agree that zoning will replace the present 
wilderness of Cyberspace, implicitly adhering to a globalist boundary approach in 
cyberspace, in concert with Johnson and Post. In this spatial realm where technology is 
king, zoning will be achieved through code--a tool, as Johnson and Post suggest, more 
perfect than any equivalent tool of zoning in real space.120 In further recognition of a 
spatial approach to cyberspace, it is, then, probably the case that both the cost of drawing 
borders--identifying digital information as one's own--and the cost of monitoring border 
trespasses--detecting unauthorized copying or alterations--seem to be no higher in 
Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[G]eography, however, is a virtually meaningless construct 
on the Internet."); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462-63 (D. Ma. 
1997).
116 Lawrence Lessig, The zones of cyberspace, Stan. L. Rev. 1403 (1996), at 1403 [Hereinafter, 
Lessig, Zones of cyberspace’]; Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might 
Teach, 113 Harvard Law Review 501 (1999), at 3, 55; Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of 
Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 703 (1998), at 704, 714-715 
[Hereinafter, ‘Shapiro, The Disappearance’] and Fn. 29 & additional sources there. See, also, Soja, 
Surveying Law and Borders, Supra note 51, at 1427. For earlier observations, see also, M. Ethan 
Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First Amendment, 104 Yale L.J. 
1681 (1995), referring to Joshua Meyrowitz, No sense of place: The impact of electronic media on 
social behavior (1985), at 38 ([P]hysical settings and media "settings" are part of a continuum 
rather than a dichotomy), at 1686.
117 Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 56 (1999), at 60, 64.
118 Lessig, Zones of cyberspace, supra note 64, at 1409.
119 Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 Emory L.J. 869, (1996), at 886-901.
120 Lessig, Zones of cyberspace, supra note 64, at 1409.
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Cyberspace than they are for real property.121 Such costs may even be lower in 
Cyberspace thanks to recent technological developments.122
In opposition to Lessig’s view regarding a continuous physical-virtual spatiality lays a 
competing globalist boundary approach, which suggests that specialty in cyberspace, is 
in fact, separate from that of the physical world. This view, as well, upholds a strict 
technologically centered approach, while suggesting that spatiality is mostly a 
technological concern.123
The leaders of this alternative libertarian orthodoxy are David Post and David 
Johnson.124 Their major explicit globalist premise, therefore, is that Cyberspace is a 
space or has the characteristics of a space, in disconnection from physical space.125 As 
they suggest, many of the jurisdictional and substantive quandaries raised by border-
crossing electronic communications could be resolved by one simple principle: 
conceiving of Cyberspace as a distinct space for purposes of legal analysis by 
recognizing a legally significant border between Cyberspace and the physical world.126
On a normative level, their argument then follows to argue against the adaptation of 
“geographic legal space” to “cyber space or spaces”. Traditional legal reasoning, we 
are told, is not only secondary in constraining behavioral preferences on-line, but 
potentially disruptive. Consequently, because there are no physical locales there should 
not be ‘legal’ ones.127 Thus, any insistence on "reducing" all on-line transactions to a 
121 Trotter Hardy, supra note 43, at 259.
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical 
Model, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 395 (1999), at 396; Lawrence Lessig, The Death of Cyberspace, Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. 337 (2000), at 344 [Hereinafter, ’ Lessig, The Death of Cyberspace’].
124 Johnson & Post, supra note 59, at 1379; David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every 
Continent": Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1055 (1998); David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 Wayne L. Rev. 155, 
161 (1996). 
For early libertarian literature on the matter, see, primarily, John Perry Barlow, Is There a There in 
Cyberspace?, at: <www.eff.org/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/utne_community.html>  
(last visited ooctober. 1, 2003); see also Esther Dyson et al., Cyberspace and the American 
Dream:A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age (Aug. 22, 1994), at 
<www.pff.org/position_old.html> ; Mitchell Kapor & John Perry Barlow, Across the Electronic 
Frontier, July 10, 1990 (July 10, 1990), available at 
<www.eff.org/pub/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/eff.html>, reprinted in Robert B. 
Gelman & Stanton McCandlish, Protecting Yourself Online:The Definitive Resource on Safety, 
Freedom, and Privacy in Cyberspace 14 (1998).
125 Johnson & Post, supra note 59, at 1379, 1381.
126 Id, p. 1378.
127 Id, 1370-72. See, also, Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. R. 1095 (1996), at 
1098-99 [Hereinafter, ‘Burk, Federalism’]; Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of 
Regulatory Arbitrage, in Borders in Cyberspace 129, 142-55 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 
1997); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, in Borders in 
Cyberspace, Emory L. J. 911 (1996), at 84, 85-87 [Hereinafter, ‘Reidenberg, Governing 
Networks’]; See, Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 100-03 
(1996) (Supporting the "United States District Court for the District of Cyberspace”).
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legal analysis based in geographic terms presents, in effect, a new "mind-body" 
problem on a global scale.128
As a legal matter, leading an original globalist border theory approach to cyberspace, 
they treat Cyberspace as a separate "space" to which the application of distinct sets of 
laws should come naturally.129 Therefore, we must either refrain from applying these 
ineffective real- space laws to Cyberspace, or devise new laws or modes of regulation 
that can effectively regulate Cyberspace. In reaching their result they argue why localist 
border theory concepts such as ‘physical proximity’, ‘locations’ and ‘boundaries’ are no 
longer a prime determinant of the relationship between cause and effect in human 
interaction on line.130 Acceptance of the so-called "separateness" of Cyberspace also 
encourages an inference that the character of Cyberspace law must differ from the 
character of law governing real space.131
Using this new approach, they suggest, we would no longer ask the unanswerable 
question "where" in the geographical world a Net-based transaction occurred.132 In 
conclusion, Johnson and Post argue that the power to control activity in Cyberspace has 
only the most tenuous connections to physical locales.133 Upholding a typical globalist 
boundary approach in Cyberspace, they argue, physical borders no longer function as 
signposts informing individuals of the obligations assumed by entering into a new, 
legally significant, space.134 Individuals are unaware of the existence of those borders as 
they move through virtual space.135
Interestingly enough, these two globalist boundary approaches to cyberspace are mostly 
compared for what they disagree about; that is, whether specialty in cyberspace is 
separate than that of the physical world. At the same time, it is important to mention that 
both views also seem to share similar globalist spatial proposition. Both, in fact, agree 
that spatiality is mostly a technological concern. By default, both approaches also give 
only a secondary role to law as a behavioral constraint in cyberspace. Inherently 
complying with a globalist notion of spatiality, both positively concur that as much as 
zoning can serve us to uphold on-line locality, strict ‘gateway’ technology zoning is 
capable to provide a comprehensive boundary theory, that is, clearly without the need or 
ability to construct of legal solutions, such as the legal fiction of on-line locales.
As would be argued later on, a preferred localist boundary theory and practice in 
cyberspace, may in fact allow us to avoid the technological challenge of zoning 
cyberspace with totality – the problematic creation of an inherent continuous space within 
128 Johnson & Post, at 1378.
129 Id, at 1379; David Johnson & David Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed? A Meditation on 
the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in Coordinating the Internet 62 (Brian 
Kahin & James Keller, eds., 1997); Post, Governing Cyberspace, at 159.
130 See, e.g., Post & Johnson, Chaos Prevailin, at 1059.
131 Johnson & Post, at 1379, 1381.
132 Id.
133 Id, at 1371.
134 Id, at 1375.
135 Id.
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cyber locales and the erection of outer boundaries surrounding cyberspace. Based on the 
accumulated experience of law and political geography, in application of localist 
boundary theory - this technocentristic globalist boundary center of attention on outer 
boundaries and inner continuation is, in fact, of marginal practical importance. It puts less 
emphasis on both the sufficiency of inner, discontinuous and differentiated boundaries 
and locales, and the relative, adaptive and constructive nature of legal reasoning at large. 
Secondly, it also falls short of adhering to a legal zoning solution in the case technology 
fails to, while wrongly concluding that because physical borders are not applicable, the 
only alternative to zoning is technological. As Maureen O'Rourke rightly suggests, 
notwithstanding the importance of how law will eventually evolve in network 
environments, such as cyberspace, it is at least as important to fill a gap with legal 
reasoning by discussing not only the boundaries between and within physical and virtual 
space but also the boundaries between different sets of law.136 Accordingly, there is a 
need not only for understandings of what legal rules govern but also how they relate to 
each other.137 In disagreement with these globalist boundary approaches, this study later 
on argues that such legal solutions do not assume perfect scientific solutions, but legally 
functional and comprehensive ones. 
B. Anti-globalist boundary theory: Hunter and Lemley
Following the globalist approach lays an alternative anti-boundary theory one. Like its 
counter version, it also views the question of on-line spatiality as a question of strictly 
realistic factual or scientific truth. As a result, we are told that “[I]t is wishful thinking to 
assume that geographic indeterminacy will prevail and that the Internet is pure 
information”.138 Accordingly, Courts can and should take the differences between 
cyberspace and the physical world into account,139 as this notion can have a profound 
consequence for legal analysis.140 The recognition that the Internet is not just like the 
physical world, and that the ways in which it is different may matter to the outcome of 
cases, is critical.141 Consequently, strict factual or scientific truth holders, such as Hunter 
and Lemley tell us that because the metaphor is not just like the physical world – courts 
inappropriately use it. Their main message is that Cyberspace is not a real global space, 
of course, and tangible objects do not exist in locales "there”.142 Thus, declining the 
globalist spatial assumption for cyberspace, it suggests that the analogy between the 
Internet and a physical space and locales is not sustainable.143 These views as well, 
136 See, Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 Minn. 
L. Rev. 609, 641-45 (1998), at 613 [‘Hereinafter, ‘O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace’]..
137 Id.
138 See,e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and democracy on the Internet, 42 Jurimetrics J. 261 (2002), 
at 274.
139 See Mark Lemley, supra note 43, Id; Maureen A. O’Rourke, supra note 43, at 561.
140 See, Maureen A. O'Rourke, Id, at 592 and Fn. 62, referring to Robert G. Sachs, the Physics of 
Time Reversal 1 (1987).
141 Mark Lemley, supra note 43, Id.
142 Se, Dan Hunter, supra note 43, at 472; Mark A. Lemley, supra note 43, at 523; Trotter Hardy, 
supra note 43, at 217; Maureen A. O'Rourke, supra note 43, at 567.
143 See, Mark Lemley, supra note 43, Id; Josh A. Goldfoot, Antitrust Implications of Internet 
Administration, 84 Va. L. Rev. 909, 920 (1998).
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nevertheless, arguably undermine the importance of the legal constraint in the search for 
comprehensive and sustainable boundary solutions. According to this version of the 
globalist boundary discourse, factual or scientific truths, in fact, stand for a skeptical view 
of the technological constraint. 
Both the globalist and the anti-globalist approaches, in their way, seem to uphold an 
absolute view of the question of on-line spatiality, while adhering to an “all-or-nothing” 
regulative view regarding the existence of a globalist perception of an on-line space. 
From a legal perspective, this technocentristic factual or scientific truth should instead be 
only one parameter in establishing a legal truth and is but the handmaiden of legal 
reasoning.144 In opposition to these views, arguably, legal analysis must now expand 
existing jurisdictional rules into workable legal doctrine also in cyberspace, as made 
possible through the prism of the localist boundary approach.
144 See, John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, on Subordination of "Scientific Truth" to “Legal 
Truth”, In 3 Mod. Sci. Evidence - Part IV. Forensic Sciences, § 24-1.3 (2d ed.). See, also 
discussion in Part III, infra.
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III.
THE LOCALIST BOUNDARY SYNTHESIS: A LEGAL FICTION OF ON-
LINE LOCALES
A. Overview 
Legal truth, suggested here for the formalization of on-line spatiality, is in fact a tentative 
scientific truth, backed by legal values, to an inclusive legal truth constructed by courts or 
other regulating institutions. Fuller frames a legal fiction as a false statement recognized 
as having utility,145 or a statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness 
of its falsity.146 This part shows that both settings, in fact, entail a more pragmatic 
framework to formalizing on-line locales, whenever localist boundary theory is applied. 
In continuation, a legal fiction is then constructed through a three criteria classification 
scheme. First, a legal fiction has to be based on an inference justified by common 
experience in two levels. It has to be grounded on absence of other proof and be drawn 
from available evidence. Second, it has to be formalized as either conclusive, or freely 
rebuttable. Lastly, a legal fiction has to be phrased in realistic terms. A final construction 
of a legal fiction of on-line locales based in its meaning in localist boundary theory, 
would then comply with the line of argument suggested herein, which upholds that 
eventually positive law and particularly territorial privacy, can and should be applied to 
all of Cyberspace effectively. Whenever the legal fiction of on-line locale can provide, 
cyberspace should not be in any way special or immune from legal reach, such as in the 
case of territorial privacy law jurisprudence.
B. The Epistemological framework:
1. Recognition of Utility, or 
A legal fiction can be a false statement recognized as having utility.147 Such legal fictions 
would then be constructed upon their functionality.148 That requirement is also met by 
localist boundary theory, suggesting that there should be a local center that would provide 
a local public or private good commonly provided in network environments. In other 
words, the periphery should be able to determine a regulative function comprising all 
145 Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (1967), at 9.
146 Id.
147 L. Fuller, Supra note 131, at 9. A parallel shift towards a utilitarian approach was also witnessed in 
boundary theory. After the Second World War the emphasis in political geography had shifted 
from the criteria by which a boundary is drawn, to the function, which it performs. See, J.V. 
Minghi, Boundary studies in political geography, In R.E. Kasperson & J.V. Minghi (eds.), The 
structure of political geography (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), at 146; R.E. Kasperson & J.V. Minghi 
(eds.), The structure of political geography, ‘Structure: Introduction’ (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), at 
77-78.
148 Consequently, after their useful function had ended, legal fictions should and could be readily 
removed. See, Aviam Soifer, supra note 161, at 875 and Fn 11 & accompanying text.
CYBERSPACE CARTOGRAPHY
27
aspects of law as a local public or private good, which could suit the utility of the legal 
system at large. For that matter, the construction of on-line locales, upon their 
functionality should be based on three conditions. The first is the preliminary recognition 
that such distinctive locales are actually necessary. The second is that strict technological 
solutions would not suffice. Lastly, the construction of on-lie locales upon their 
functionality would need to be based on the alternative certainty that formalizing legal 
locales on-line indeed is feasible.
a.   Lack of distinctive locales
Arguably, the present inclination to either undermine demarcation between locales on-
line, in favor of globalist boundary theory support for homogenous continuation, as 
manifested by Johnson and Post; or reject boundary theory ab initia, while implicitly 
upholding only privately oriented privacy policies, as reaffirmed by other scientific 
truisms - nevertheless seems to be based on a largely accepted deformations of 
cyberspace’s architecture, in comparison to that of the physical world’s. This distortion is 
largely threefold, referring to cyberspace’s initial private sphere default rule design, the 
lack of separate transfer costs through neighboring locales, and the low transaction costs 
of entry into them.
First, historically, it has to do with the opposite way in which the public/private 
distinction has evolved in the physical world in comparison to cyberspace. In the physical 
world the public/private distinction arose out of a double movement in modern political 
and legal thought.149 On the one hand, with the emergence of the nation-state and theories 
of sovereignty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, ideas of distinctly public 
locales began to take shape.150 On the other hand, in reaction to the claims of monarchs, 
and later parliaments, to the unrestrained power to make law, a countervailing effort to 
stake out distinctively private locales free from the encroaching power of the state 
developed.151 With the expansion of the latter trend, natural rights theories were 
elaborated in the seventeenth century for the purpose of setting limits on state power, 
both over property and religious conscience.152 By 1934, the areas that people considered 
the most valuable for mines, agriculture, forestry, water development, and other uses had 
149 For the Anglo-American origins of the distinction, see, Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the 
Public/Private Distinction, U. Pa. L. Rev. 1423 (1982), at 1423 and Fn.1 referring to D. Hanson, 
From Kingdom to Commonwhealth 1-19 (1970).
For the North American experience, see the works of, Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal 
Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1980). Frug works almost exclusively from secondary sources; 
H. Hartog, Public property and private power: The cooperation of the city of New York in 
American law, 1730-1870 (1983) (Hartog's book examines New York City from the early 
eighteenth until the late nineteenth century. His thesis, which he documents in rich detail, is that 
New York City in the eighteenth century acted as a borough whose charter mixed public and 
private powers); Morton J. Horwitz, supra note 172 (a thumbnail sketch of the history of the 
distinction).
150 Morton J. Horwitz, Id, at 1423.
151 Id, 1423 and Fn. 2, referring to historical sources to support that observation.
152 Id, at 1423.
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already been appropriated.153 What were left behind (to what later became the vastly 
overextended Bureau of Land Management) were those lands that the settlers considered 
worthless, or at least more trouble than they were worth–res nullius, it seemed, and likely 
to stay that way.154 Later on, moreover, in the early years of the conservative Burger 
Court, the private sphere was further narrowed.155 In the physical world, thus far, an 
interventionist theory to limit the private sphere has not prevailed and the public sphere 
continued to serve as the default rule.156 Instead, Courts have identified constitutional law 
with the task of defining and expanding private spheres within which individuals must be 
left free from the default public domain ruled by governments.157
In cyberspace the opposing trend unmistakably has prevailed. While the physical world is 
presently subject to a default rule of a continuous public sphere that is then subject to 
distinct proprietary private sphere allotments, Cyberspace architecture, imbeds a different 
structure. In the latter, apart from the Internet’s “public roads” or backbone transit 
infrastructure, which is regulated according to telecommunications and antitrust law, the 
present default rule contains a mosaic of private allotments – namely, neighboring 
proprietary web sites. As pictorially put by Maureen Ryan, cyberspace has ‘no town 
halls, no granges, no public squares, no downtown churches or galleries or schools’.158
Thus neither public locales nor balanced territorial privacy policy have so far been 
established. Instead, only a private privacy legal rule has been adopted and too widely so. 
Cyberspace’s architecture, backed by the ’hands off’ paradigm towards privacy policy at 
large, has led to this deformation. In the present post-industrial society,159 where 
information such as the Internet’s is a major source of wealth aggregation, what has been 
the original exception seems to have become the norm.160 As Carol Rose points out, this 
‘propertization’ trend did not occur in a vacuum, but rather came directly at the expense 
153 See, Carol Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the 
Information Age, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 89, at 5, referring also to George Cameron Coggins, 
Charles F. Wilkinson, and John D. Leshy, Federal Public Land and Resources Law (4th ed. 2001), 
at 133-34.
154 Id, George Cameron Coggins, at 133-34, 139, 142-43.
155 See, e.g., Donald R.C. Pongrace, Stereotypication of the fourth amendment’s public/private 
distinction: An opportunity for clarity, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 1191 (describing a process of narrowing 
the private sphere in the years the 80’s Burger court), at 1191-1192 and Fn. 6-8 and accompanying 
text; Commentators use the term 'Burger Court' to signify the conservative majority that currently 
dominates the United States Supreme Court. See Schwartz, Fifteen Years of the Burger Court, 239 
Nation 262 (1984) (describing Court's conservative trend since Warren Burger started his first 
term as Chief Justice in 1969).
156 Louis Michael Seidman, supra note 157, at 1011 and Fn. 17 & accompanying text. (Adding that 
there always existed an alternative tradition in American constitutional law of preventing private 
corporations from interfering with freedom of speech). For a discussion of the confusion that is 
generated when the two traditions clash, see, G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet, 
Constitutional Law 739-41 (1986), at 575-78. 
157 See, Louis Michael Seidman, supra note 157, 1010-1011 and Fn. 18 & accompanying text. 
158 Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as a public space: A public trust paradigm for copyright in a digital 
world, 647 Or. L. Rev. (2000) and Fn. 249 & accompanying text.
159 On the shift from the industry economy to the present information economy, see, Patricia Mell, 
supra note 112, at 17, referring to Bell, Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society 47-
119 (1973), at 47-119. 
160 Lawrence Lessig, supra note 66, at 59.
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of what might seem to be ‘un-ownable’ diffuse resources or res communes in the tangible 
world.161 Left to self-regulatory approaches, sufficient and legally protected public 
locales arguably will not evolve, and an inner balance between private and public locales 
and territorial privacy policy more particularly, will not be achieved.162
Second, as opposed to the physical world, with little scarcity constraint on on-line access 
and use, would- be entrants to private on-line properties do not objectively value entry 
more than the landowner would objectively suffer from the entry for transfer purposes 
(and use). In the physical world, where such a reality exists, that means the need to both 
create public roads and subsidize transfer through neighboring lots. Primarily, this led to 
the development of the distinction between public and private, as private owners needed 
open access. As a result, access to private locales without consent, and the creation of a 
limited privilege to trespass was rarely done voluntarily, as explained. Moreover, 
conditions such as emergency or physical distance often made it unusually difficult for 
the landowner and would-be entrant to bargain on the conditions for entry.163 The reason 
is manifest: entrants may damage crops, commit thefts, and do other mischief. That is 
why open access was then added as a public rule. In cyberspace, however, there is no 
need for access permission through private allotments, and thus no additional need for 
particular public locales between them, has emerged. Instead, transfer between private 
allotments is primarily done through ex-jurisdictional public roads in the form of 
cyberspace’s backbone transit services. Gateway homepages, the entrance to private web 
sites, are not dependently accessible among themselves and for that reason where not 
seen as inflicting additional transfer cost to neighboring private locales. To conclude, in 
cyberspace, there is no need for transfer permission between private web sites. Neither is 
there an inherent technical need to subsidize transfer costs through the construction of 
public locales as a mean of economizing on additional transfer costs. 
Moreover, transfer costs are also lower in cyberspace whenever the transferee’s 
destination is a would-be public locale. In some cases, forum providers voluntarily set 
aside some area for open use within private websites (or would-be private locales), thus 
diminishing the need to transfer between separate locales. Major Internet providers are 
obvious candidates for the modern application of this principle, as they use their message 
boards and chat rooms to foster a sense of community. Sites, such as eBay and 
Amazon.com, whose purpose is strictly private e-commerce, confirm this observation. 
Such is also the prevailing practice in real time "chat rooms",164 news groups,165 and 
161 Carol M. Rose, supra note 176, at 7; See, also, Paolo Carpignano et al., Chatter in the Age of 
Electronic Reproduction: Talk Television and the "Public Mind," in The Phantom Public Sphere 
93 (Bruce Robbins ed., 1993), at 96-97, at 93 ((relating this pattern to the more broad influence of 
mass media).
162 See, particularly, discussion in Part III.C.2, infra.
163 Robert C. Ellickson, supra note 114, at 1383-1384.
164 Chat rooms allow interested individuals to participate in on-line discussions in real time on a 
myriad of general interest topics by sending and receiving messages via their ISP. See generally 
ACLU v. Reno, supra note 61, at 834-36 (surveying common methods of communication on the 
Internet).
165 Usenet news groups are a loosely organized collection of distributed bulletin boards, each one 
dedicated to a particular topic. See generally ACLU v. Reno, Id (surveying common methods of 
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remote information retrieval practices such as bulletin-board services and message 
boards.166 Notwithstanding the significance of these new developments in cyberspace’s 
boundary equilibrium, neither the present architecture of cyberspace nor the present day 
United States federal governments’ technocentristic self-regulation approaches enhance 
these areas to the protected legal status of public locales, nor do they act to reestablish the 
balance between both types of locales, in favor of the latter. Third, in opposition to the 
physical world, transaction costs generated by web sites landowners and would-be 
entrants to negotiate a license or easement of entry for open public use without the use of 
any licensing regimes are relatively low. As a result, with no need for their corrective 
minimization, preservation of the present private allotment mosaic seems to remain 
stable, while socially implying inefficient allocative results.
b.   The insufficiency of technological solutions
The lack of inner equilibrium between the different types of locales ultimately may have 
enticed policy makers and theoreticians alike, to make the normative leap, which implies 
that law suffers from an inherent inability to correct this anomaly. That is, as the analogy 
between the Internet and a physical locale is not particularly strong,167 scientific truism 
largely upholds that it is wishful thinking to assume that legally made geographic 
indeterminacy could prevail.168 The recognition that the Internet is not just like the 
physical world, and that the ways in which it is different may matter to the outcome of 
cases, we are told, is critical.169 In fact, the United States federal government’s privacy 
policy still encourages the withdrawal of law as a balancing constraint, as seen with the 
FTC's stance toward online privacy, which emphasizes self-regulation via the adoption of 
privacy policies.170 Arguably, technology alone, thus far, has failed to provide protection 
comparable to that, which is provided in law.171 It is, at least presently, incapable of 
establishing a comprehensive boundary solution by itself, for three main reasons: its 
communication on the Internet); See, also, Loving v. Boren, 956 F. Supp. 953, 954 (W.D. Okla. 
1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 771 (10th Cir. 1998) ("News groups are interactive 'places' on the Internet").
166 See, generally, ACLU v. Reno, supra note 61, at 834-36.
167 See, e.g., Mark Lemley, supra note 43, id; Josh A. Goldfoot, supra note 88, at 920 (“At best 
‘cyberspace’ is a convenient term describing a set of communications achieved through the 
Internet.”).
168 See, e.g., Reidenberg, Yahoo and democracy, supra note 89, at 274; Lawrence Lessig & Paul 
Resnick, supra note 72, at 396; Lessig, The Death of Cyberspace, at 344; Johnson & Post, at 1379; 
Post & Johnson, Chaos Prevailing, supra note 73, Id; Post, Governing Cyberspace, at 161.
169 See, Maureen A. O'Rourke, supra note 43, at 592 and Fn. 62, referring to Robert G. Sachs, the 
Physics of Time Reversal 1 (1987).
170 Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2041 (2000); 
Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 
Iowa L. Rev. 497 (1995), at 508-11 [Hereinafter, ‘Reidenberg, Setting Standards’].
171 Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t 
Get), Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2001), at 79; See, Joel Reidenberg, Jennifer Barrett, Evan Hendricks, 
Solveig Singleton & David Sobel, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 59, at 60; Joel R. 
Reidenberg, Restoring Americans, supra note 22, at 771. 
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inherent inability to self-provide with a public/private distinction, its poorly practiced 
appeal and its lack of compliance with existing law.
To begin with, as a technological solution, ‘gateway’ or access-based zoning is used to 
restrict only private locales ex-ante, namely proprietary web sites. In addition, 
demarcation lines among network service providers such as America OnLine, 
CompuServe, or Prodigy only generate important boundaries around privately owned 
proprietary services. Private contractual arrangements determine the availability and the 
conditions of access for network connections.172 Without a gateway, interactions are 
effectively prohibited.173 In fact, technology does not support an inherent distinction 
between public and private places, but instead only the further fencing of private locales, 
ultimately taking no notice of the needed public ones. 
Second, even for private locales this solution is poorly practiced; as it decreases the level 
of accessibility and attractiveness of web sites that choose to independently fence 
themselves in. As a result, as some courts have already recognized, although gateway 
technology has been available on the World Wide Web for some time now, it is not 
available to all Web users, 174 and is just now becoming technologically feasible for chat 
rooms and USENET newsgroups.175 Gateway technology is not omnipresent in 
cyberspace, and because without it there is no means of age verification, most notably, 
cyberspace still remains largely unzoned--and unzoneable.176 As Court has recognized, 
for user-based zoning to be effectual, an agreed-upon code (or "tag") would have to be 
present; screening software or browsers with screening capabilities would have to be able 
to identify the "tag"; and those programs would have to be extensively available—and 
then widely used--by Internet users. At present, none of these circumstances prevail.177 It 
is still the case that screening software "is not in wide use today" and "only a handful of 
browsers have screening capabilities.”178 There is, furthermore, no agreed-upon "tag" for 
those programs to identify.179 As a substitute, such "gateway" technology still requires 
Internet users to enter identifiable information about themselves before they can access 
the countless private locales of cyberspace.180
Third, strict technologically based zoning is not backed by the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act ("DMCA") protective measurements. Thus, it does not seem to invalidate 
the requirement for a contractual framework in case territorial privacy is ignored.181
Originally, since the enactment of the DMCA in 1998, the Copyright Act has addressed 
172 Reidenberg, Governing Networks, supra note 76, at 917. 
173 Id, at 918; 
174 See, Reno v. ACLU, supra note 61, at 845; Shea v. Reno, 930 F.Supp. 916, 933-934 
(S.D.N.Y.1996).
175 Id, Reno v. ACLU, at 891.
176 See, Id, p.846; Shea v. Reno, supra note 197, at 934.
177 Shea v. Reno, Id, at 945-946.
178 Id, at 945-946.
179 See, Reno v. ACLU, supra note 61, at 848; Shea, supra note 197, at 945.
180 See, Reno v. ACLU, supra note 61, at 845.
181 For the alternative solution based on territorial privacy, see, also, discussion in Part III.C.2.a, infra.
CYBERSPACE CARTOGRAPHY
32
access to copyrighted material as well as the scope of exclusive rights therein.182 Under 
the DMCA, it is illegal to "circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a work protected" by copyright.183 But only those access control measures that 
"require the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of 
the copyright owner, to gain access to the work," are protected against circumvention.184
Most e-commerce web sites, such as eBay, contain some copyrighted material in addition 
to their uncopyrighted product and pricing information. However, they do not use access 
control measures protected by the DMCA, in part because such steps would discourage 
entry by welcome as well as unwanted visitors.185 As a result, technological zoning 
assumes a contractual relationship, whereas due to the lack sufficient will and 
implementation of identification and contractual consent, such a solution is still 
inefficient. A territorially based solution instead would only necessitate unilateral notice 
at the entrance to on-line locales should be preferred, as it may overcome the need for 
identification and contractual consent.186 As a practical matter, observance in private 
locales should be replaced through a mechanism of voluntary disclosure of whichever 
types of information, namely, transactional, registration and clickstream data, that would 
be abided to by would-be entrants;187 In public locales, however, observance should be 
freely allowed, as long as a notice of the public locale is brought forth, but then be solely 
restricted to the collection of non-identifiable registration and clickstream data.188
Law, if constructed to be, can easily overcome any of these geographical discontinuities 
that such digital coercion threatens to entail. Continuity in the spatial pattern of 
preferences should then suggest a need to define peripheral locations in a more narrow 
and gradual form, implying that such a boundary would be valuable.189 A localist 
boundary theory, thus, would put emphasis on drawing boundaries that should evolve 
through a case-by- case common law development in which tribunals seek guidance in 
legislation and treaties. Various courts already uphold the value of this regulative 
approach.190 In the physical world, this sort of dialogue between courts and lawmakers to 
delineate the geographic limits is the heart of what Farber calls in the context of 
international environmental law the evolutionary approach.191 In the midst of a 
technological regulatory vacuum and due to the arguable sufficiency of the legal solution, 
this same approach, ultimately, should hold for cyberspace. 
182 17 U.S.C. §1201 (Supp. IV 1998).
183 Id, at §1201(a)(1)(A).
184 Id, at §1201(a)(3)(B).
185 O'Rourke, Property Rights, supra note 43, at 583-584 and Fn 95 & accompanying text. 
186 See, also, discussion in Part III.C.2.a, infra.
187 Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 275, 280 (1974); see also, Ruth 
Gavison, supra note 1, at 432-33.
188 Richard B. Parker, Id, at 280; See also, Ruth Gavison, supra note 1, Id.
189 See, Christopher D. Stone, supra note 44, Id.
190 Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that 
electronic signals generated by computers that minors used to access plaintiff's telephone system 
were sufficiently tangible to maintain action for trespass to personal property), at 473-74 
(commenting on applying common law to modern facts); See also CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber 
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (relying on Thrifty-Tel for support in 
finding electronic signals sufficient for trespass to chattels action). 
191 See, Daniel A. Farber, supra note 44, at 1273; Christopher D. Stone, supra note 44, Id.
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c. The sufficiency of legal solutions
A functional subsistence of such a distinction between a public and a private sphere or 
locales of human activity, primarily, is a central tenet of jurisprudence in liberal 
democracy.192 The appearance of capitalist market relations as a self-regulating economic 
system has enhanced the centrality of private individualism that was then fenced against 
public intrusions. Overall, in Western democracies, it was market growth that shaped 
political and legal interactions between both spheres.193 Notably, in the present service 
economy, information has become an increasingly valuable commodity.194 That 
development eventually penetrated also the various legal fields and became impossible to 
ignore.195 Notably, as a legal concern, the private/public distinction also came to be 
192 For U.S. Federal courts upholding the difference between public sphere and private sphere, see, 
e.g., See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (discussing human activity in 
terms of public and private spheres) (citing United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 
1981)); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 941-43 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting distinction between 
activity in public and private spheres). See, also, Robert H. Mnookin, supra note 149, at 1429 
(noting distinction between public and private spheres relating to individual rights vis-a-vis 
government powers).
193 See, primarily, Trent Schroyer, The Critique of Domination. New York: George Braziller (1973); 
Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press (1975); 
Andrew Fraser, The Legal Theory We Need Now, 1978 Socialist Review 147 (1978); Ellen 
Wood, Ellen Meiksins, The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism, 127 New 
Left Review 66 (1981).
194 Patricia Mell, supra note 112, at 26-41 (While information has always been a core resource 
(referring to Anthony G. Oettinger, Information Resources: Knowledge and Power in the 21st 
Century, 209 Science 191, 191 (1980))
195 For different legal applications regarding the distinction, see, e.g., Karl Klare, E., The 
Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1358 (1982) (showing how the 
public/private distinction is used in historical studies of legal change); Isaac Balbus, Commodity 
Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the Relative Autonomy of the Law, 11 Law & Society 
Review 571(1977) (for a social science approach to the relationship between political economy 
and the public/private distinction in law); 
For a critical view of this movement see Duncan Kennedy, supra note 151 (for an internal critique 
of the public/private dichotomy in legal discourse). Any progress with this paper’s claims would 
first confront Duncan Kennedy's notable critique of the public/private initial dichotomy. In 
retrospective, Kennedy’s claim remained a cry in the wilderness. As Ellickson concludes, all 
analysts now agree that it is important to uphold the private/public distinction. See, also, Robert C. 
Ellickson, supra note 114, at 1381 et. al. Moreover, even Kennedy himself has reconsidered this 
approach. See Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1984). 
Nevertheless, in response to Kennedy’s critique, two central observations could be made. First, 
based on his normatively-neutral two-stage test, Kennedy upholds that he never inherently denies 
the distinction’s normative potential to survive the test. Instead, Kennedy’s argument is positive to 
suggest that such a distinction is no more practical in the current legal system, and should thus not 
prevail. This is based on the view that the range of distinctions that characterize liberal legality, 
"state/society, individual/group, right/power, contract/tort, law/policy, legislative/judiciary, 
objective/subjective, reason/fiat, freedom/coercion" are all going through "similar processes of 
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known for its application on questions of legal jurisdiction, examining the mechanisms 
by which legal boundaries can be established and altered.196
In a seminal study on the public sphere, Carol Rose indicates that in the American legal 
tradition there were largely three types of theories to justify public locales, originally as 
in the constituting waterfront beach cases.197 The first is a theory of 'custom,' where the 
public asserts ownership of property under some claim so ancient that it antedates any 
memory to the contrary.198 Clearly, network environments such as the Internet are far too 
young to give rise to such ancient claims, such that antedates any memory to the contrary. 
Nevertheless, there is no inherent reason to assume that such a claim could not evolve in 
cyberspace in the long future. Second is a prescriptive or dedicatory theory, by which a 
period of public usage gives rise to an implied grant or gift from private owners;199 In 
cyberspace such a theory might turn to be too limited in scope to undermine the ability 
and incentives of website owners to explicitly limit privacy protection by giving notice of 
a public sphere, and thus tortuously unobtrusive. The third is a 'public trust' theory, to the 
effect that the public always has rights of access to the property in question, and that any 
decline", at 1349, 1350, Id. At least on this factual ground Kennedy’s argument might seem to be 
too adventurous. See, e.g., Seidenman, arguing, in fact, that during the Lochner era an assumption 
of “natural” boundary was made in the Supreme Court. See, Louis Michael Seidman, supra note 
159, at 1006; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); For a supporting survey of the era, see G. 
Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet, supra note 179, at 739-41.
Second, kennedy is inherently not concerned with the exact substance of each sphere, but then 
assumes their practical existance. See, e.g., at 1350. Thus, in his somewhat tautologous structure, 
separate spheres, such as individual/group, right/power, contract/tort, may nevertheless exist as 
long as no boundary is put in place between them. Arguably, once separation in content between 
spheres exists, albeit vague or otherwise clear, any justification in ignoring  the existence of 
boundary in between should only be possible in marginal extreme situations. See, also, discussion 
in Part III.B.1, hereafter. 
196 See, e.g., Jeff Weintraub, supra note 159, at 9; Gerald E. Frug, supra note 172, Id.
197 See, Curtis J. Berger, supra note 112, at 655-659.
198 Carol Rose, The comedy of the commons: Custom, commerce, and inherently public, 53 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 711, at 714 [Hereinafter, ‘Rose, The comedy of the commons’] & Fn. 16, referring to 
Courts in Florida, Hawaii, and Oregon have adopted this approach. See City of Daytona Beach, 
294 So. 2d 73 (Fla.); County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 Hawaii 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974); In re Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968); Thornton, 462 
P.2d 671 (Or.).
199 See, Rose, The comedy of the commons, Id, at 714 & Fn. 15, referring to California's Gion, 465 
P.2d 50. Other states in which courts have recently applied the 'implied dedication' or prescriptive 
approach to the waterfront are Texas, in Seaway Co., 375 S.W.2d 923, and--somewhat reluctantly-
-New York, in Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 
1972), aff'd, 45 A.D.2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974) (mem.). Cf. Department of Natural 
Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630 (1975) (doctrine held inapplicable 
because no clear intent to dedicate); State v. Beach Co., 271 S.C. 425, 248 S.E.2d 115 (1978) (no 
intent to dedicate). For commentary, see, for example, Livingston, Public Access to Virginia's 
Tidelands: A Framework for Analysis of Implied Dedications and Public Prescriptive Rights, 24 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 669 (1983); Comment, Public or Private Ownership of Beaches: An 
Alternative to Implied Dedication, 18 UCLA L. Rev. 795 (1971); Note, This Land Is My Land: 
The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its Application to California Beaches, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1092 (1971).
CYBERSPACE CARTOGRAPHY
35
private rights are subordinate to the public's 'trust' rights;200 Carol Rose calls such lands 
"inherently public property”.201 In the physical world, the American legal system has 
strongly suggested that some kinds of property should not be held exclusively in private 
hands, but should be open to the public or at least subject to what Roman law called the 
'jus publicum,' or the 'public right.'202 Upholding the “Inherently public property” (jus 
publicum) doctrine, for this public to claim property, two elements were essential: first, 
the property had to be capable of monopolization by private persons, or would have been 
without doctrines securing public access against such threats.203 Second, the public's 
claim had to be superior to that of the private owner, because the properties themselves 
were most valuable when used by indefinite and unlimited numbers of persons--by the 
public at large.204 Courts have become receptive to requests to extend this technique to 
preserve a public sphere beyond its traditional water-related focus. The public trust 
doctrine has been invoked to support claims for the preservation of any number of types 
of property deemed public resources including parks,205 marshlands,206 archeological 
sites,207 etc. In accordance with this result, Courts have distinctively adhered to public 
places as ex-jurisdictional locations for private excludability. 
In the digital era, without acknowledging a separate public sphere there is no ‘place’ 
left for unilateral non-identifiable data collection, for either non-commercial or 
commercial purposes alike. Policymaking should now further legitimize the expansion 
of information collection in public locales in cyberspace. As explained, the only way to 
balance that activity with private territorial privacy protection policies, as it is balanced 
in the physical world, would be to uphold distinctive public and private locales. In that 
200 See, Rose, The comedy of the commons, Id, at 714 & Fn. 14, referring to State v. Superior Court, 
29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865; City of Berkeley, 
606 P.2d 362; Van Ness, 393 A.2d 571; Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d 47; Matthews v. Bay 
Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984); Just v. 
Marinette Country, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768-69 (1972). 
For physical world context, Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged 
Traditional Doctrine, 79 Yale L. J. 762 (1970); Note, Public Beach Access Exactions: Extending 
the Public Trust Doctrine to Vindicate Public Rights, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1049, 1069-86 (1981). For 
cyberspace context, see, also, Maureen Ryan, supra note 181, Id; Molly S. van Houweling, 
Cultivating Open Information Platforms: A Land Trust Model, 1 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 
309 (2002). 
201 Carol Rose, The comedy of the commons, Id, at 720.
202 See, Rose, The comedy of the commons, at 715-716 and relevant footnotes for additional source, 
especially Fn. 10 & accompanying text:, referring to Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law 
in American Legal History, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 217 (1984); Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 1403. For the 'jus publicum' 
(or 'publici juris') language, see Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 76 (1851), 
discussed in Scheiber, supra, at 222.
203 Id, Rose, The comedy of the commons, at 774.
204 Id, at 774.
205 See, e.g., Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970); Wade v. Kramer, 459 
N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 
1966).
206 See, e.g., Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973).
207 See, e.g., San Diego County Archaeological Soc'y v. Compadres, 81 Cal. App. 3d 923, 146 Cal. 
Rptr. 786 (1978) (holding that the public trust doctrine cannot be extended to cover archeological 
remains located on private property).
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regard, the claim that certain portions of cyberspace deserve or would require a public 
on-line locale status should become compelling.208
2. Consciousness of Falsity
Alternatively to a legal function, such as non-material locales, being a statement 
propounded with a recognition of utility – a legal fiction may incur complete or partial 
consciousness of its falsity. In the Anglo-American jurisprudence it is widely 
acknowledged that no court, should base a decision solely on cognitive science if doing 
so would exclude the different values of the law, such as fairness and justice to the 
litigants.209 This should arguably, be also the experience of formalizing a localist 
boundary theory for cyberspace based on a legal fiction of locales. In continuation, there 
are two distinctions that narrow the subject matter of any legal fictions. The first is the 
distinction between a fiction and a lie.210 A fiction is distinguished from a lie by the fact 
that it is not meant to deceive.211 The user of a legal fiction does not intend to produce 
belief in those who hear or read it. Neither should a user of a legal fiction herself believe 
the false statement. It is probably the case that, thus far, no such intentional lie was 
introduced into the boundary theory discourse regarding on-line spatiality. This 
distinction is, therefore less relevant to the present framework. The second and more 
relevant to cyberspace’s spatiality discussion is the distinction between a fiction and an 
erroneous conclusion.212 A fiction is generally distinguished from an erroneous 
conclusion or scientific hypothesis by the fact that its author adopts it with knowledge of 
its falsity.213 In such cases, the author of the legal fiction "either positively disbelieves it 
or is partially conscious of its untruth or inadequacy."214 Along the lines of this 
distinction, scientific truism has given rise to many commentators in criticizing Courts 
for applying the doctrine of trespass to chattel, most notably, to cyberspace.215 Evidently, 
no statement, describing either the physical world or network environments can 
adequately describe reality. Fuller reserved the label of "false," however, only for those 
statements that are outstanding or unusual in their inadequacy.216 Once the label of 
208 David J. Goldstone, supra note 42, at 3.
209 See, e.g., New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 197, 43 S.Ct. 270, 275, 67 L.Ed. 605 
(1923); Railroad Comm'n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 
579, 42 S.Ct. 232, 234, 66 L.Ed. 371 (1922). See, also, Chief Judge, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudence or “Juriscience”?, William and 
Mary Law Review 525 (1984), at 525-526.
210 L. Fuller, supra note 131, at 7. See, also, Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light 
Co., 92 S.Ct. 637 U.S. Fla. 1972. Decided Jan. 12, 1972; 405 U.S. 948, 92 S.Ct. 929 (Reversed 
and remanded) (rejecting a jurisprudential approach that meets the standard at law, but it is 
technologically unsound), p. 459. See, also, discussion at Part II.C.1.b, infra.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 L. Fuller, supra note 131, at 8.
215 Hunter, supra note 43; Maureen A. O’Rourke, supra note 43, at 595-97; Dan Burk, The Trouble 
With Trespass, at 34 [Hereinafter, ‘Burk, The Trouble With Trespass’].
216 L. Fuller, supra note 131, at 11-12.
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"false" has attached, and the statement has been made with no intent to deceive, we have 
a legal fiction.217 Accordingly, a statement must be false before it can be a fiction. 
This perception of truth is relative and pragmatic. The legal truth of any statement is 
merely a question of its adequacy, whether it comes close to describing reality. Finally, 
rested upon the user's recognition of the statement's falsity, a distinction between benign 
and "dangerous" legal fiction becomes useful. The "danger" of a legal fiction varies 
inversely with the acuteness of the awareness that the assumption is false. In other words, 
a legal fiction is "wholly safe" only when the statement is used with "complete 
consciousness of its falsity".218 Fuller considered such a legal fiction benign.219 On the 
other hand, a legal fiction becomes "dangerous" only if the user is unaware of the falsity 
of the statement. One way to avoid this "danger" is for the user of the legal fiction to 
embellish it with a grammatical motif of its falsity, such as to propose that technically 
locales do not subsist on-line, or to say that their existence, instead, is legally fictional. 
The latter approach could be then justified either because technology is not capable or 
partly technically immature enough to uphold on-line spatiality or self-regulated 
differentiated locales, in their strict scientific sense, as is presently the case in 
cyberspace.220
Even if a legal fiction of on-line locales is finally agreed upon, technically it might still 
be incapable of defining exact jurisdictional boundaries between different locales. As 
acknowledged for the present proprietary-based information privacy analysis in 
cyberspace, the idea that an individual has a protected right in controlling disclosure of 
use of personal information directly conflicts with the concept of public distribution of 
information.221 Yet, as important as it for a legal system to make an effort to locate this 
exact jurisdictional boundary, whether or not finding that exact location is possible and 
should be a finite goal, it is yet more imminent for a liberal democratic society to agree 
on the existance of such a distinction in the first place.222 Thus, even the ambiguity 
regarding the appropriate location of a boundary between locales is not a unique concern 
to the digital era.223 Occasionally, even before the information age, it has been a source of 
controversy.224 Since the realist movement in American jurisprudence in the 1930's,225
the boundary's ambiguity has become increasingly obvious.226 In dealing with this issue, 
217 Id.
218 Id, at 10.
219 Id.
220 On the institutional explanation for this argument, see discussion in Part III.C.2, infra.
221 See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, supra note 1, ¶ 8.05.
222 See, e.g., Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 9, at 1132.
223 See, e.g., Patricia Mell, supra note 112, at. 4, 22.
224 Se, Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation, 
130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1429, 1429 (1982), at 1430-34 (discussing various definitions of dividing line 
between public and private spheres).
225 For a general description of the realist challenge to formalism that began in the 1920's, see 
Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in The politics of law: A progressive critique 
26-29 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
226 For discussions of the current ambiguity surrounding the public/private distinction, see Papers 
from the University of Pennsylvania Law Review on the Public/Private Distinction Held at the 
University of Pennsylvania on January 20, 1982, 130 U. PA. L. Rev. 1289-1602 (1982); Duncan 
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it should be clear at the outset that the system will never operate as cleanly as do the rules
governing property rights on land.227 As Richard Epstein points out, for land disputes it is 
generally clear when one person has crossed the boundary that separates his or her 
property from another.228 The definition and identification of appropriate boundaries is 
never as clear in disputes over privacy.229
This legal intricacy only continued the tension that existed in earlier telecommunications 
systems.230 Especially notable is the merging of telephone and television with computers 
that has resulted in the development of a flexible and diverse international information-
exchange system which allowed the nearly instantaneous transfer of information through 
cables, satellites, microwave relays and fiber optics.231 Nevertheless, simply by 
maintaining a positivistic right to privacy, both initially uphold the constituting 
framework of jurisdictional boundaries and thus the need for an inner balance between 
private and public rationales.232 Thus, even accepting these certainty limitations, it is 
possible to make some measurable progress to a sensible end.233 Instead of offering 
reconciliation, constitutional law allows us to live with contradiction by establishing a 
shifting, uncertain, and contested boundary between distinct public and private locales 
within which conflicting values can be separately nurtured.234 The legal fiction of on-line 
locales, can, thus, still be seen benign assuming that it is to be still stated in complete 
consciousness of its falsity.
Conceptually, the incorporation of a new legal fiction to cyberspace’s boundary theory 
should be seen as a general legal standard. The use of fictions or presumptions is, indeed, 
very popular in American jurisprudence and should therefore not be considered 
extraneous or passé by cyber lawyers.235 Presumptions, and the associated burdens of 
Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 
(1982). 
227 See, Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: And Putting it Back Together Again, In The 
Right to Privacy, Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul eds., (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) 1, at 7
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See, e.g., Daniel Bell, Communications Technology--For Better or for Worse, Harv. Bus. Rev., 
May-June 1979, at 20, at 21.
231 Id.
232 For the view suggesting that the private/public distinction involves especially questions of 
jurisdiction, see, e.g., Jeff Weintraub, The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction, In 
Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a grand Dichotomy  (Jeff Weintraub 
and Krishan Kumar, eds) (University of Chicago press, 1997) 1, at 9.
233 See, Richard A. Epstein, supra note 151, at 7.
234 Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary 
Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, Yale L.J. 1006 (1987), at 1007.
235 For the leading scholarship on Legal Fictions are, G. Calabresi, Ideals, beliefs, attitudes, and the 
law: Private law perspectives on a public law problem (1985); G. Calabresi, A common law for 
the age of statutes 172-77 (1982); Abrams, A Constitutional Law for the Age of Anxiety (Book 
Review), 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1643 (1985); Block, Suits Against Government Officials and the 
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060 (1946); Note, Penumbras and Privacy: A 
Study of the Use of Fictions in Constitutional Decision-Making, 89 W. VA. L. Rev. 859 (1985); 
Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 
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proof necessary to overcome them, presently appear virtually everywhere in law.236 In 
property law, for example, a specific legal fiction is the presumption that one who owned 
soil owned all the way to the heavens and to the depths.237 In employment discrimination 
litigation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the burden of evidentiary 
production (and thus the applicable presumption) can shift to the defendant if the plaintiff 
was a qualified (but rejected) applicant and a member of a historically oppressed 
group.238 In constitutional law, the equal protection doctrine implicitly operates as a 
presumption, requiring a court to determine a "level of scrutiny" to apply to a challenged 
statutory or regulatory classification.239 In corporate law a separate legal personality has 
been fictitiously constructed for corporations.240 A legal fiction is commonly seen as an 
assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law, such as 
differentiated private and public on-line locales, has undergone alteration, such as in 
cyberspace, yet its letter remained unchanged.241 Thus the fiction of “inviting” in the 
“attractive nuisance” cases is intended to escape the rule that there is no duty of care 
toward entrants.242 The ubiquity of presumptions has led a number of prominent 
commentators and judges to posit that most rules of law are little more than 
presumptions, subject to rebuttal by the adversely affected party.243 There are truly few 
absolute principles in law.244 Those principles that may appear to be absolute are, in 
reality, presumptions, which may be overcome in appropriate circumstances.245
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 627 (1994). For some reason, however, interest cooled 
down until the 1920's when Roscoe Pound, John Chipman Gray, and Lon Fuller reawakened this 
dormant jurisprudential technique. Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the 
Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, Yale L. J. (1990) 1, at 11.
236 See R. Pound, Interpretations of legal history 131 (1923); L. Fuller, supra note 131, at 1; 
Wilkinson, J. Harvie III., Toward a Jurisprudence of Presumptions," 67 N.Y.U. L Rev. 907 
(1992), at 907; Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 871 (Summer, 1986), at 
872, 875; Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Legal Presumption, 16 J. L. ECON. 
ORG  (April 2000) 1, at 2.
237 C. Donahue, JR., T. Kauper, & P. Martin, Cases and materials on property 291 (1974). See 
generally W. Empson, Seven types of ambiguity (1930), and the extensive work by Owen 
Barfield, including in particular, Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction, in O. Barfield, The rediscovery 
of meaning, and other essays 44 (1977).
238 See, McDonell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
239 See, Gunther, Gerald, and Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutional Law (1998). Lon Fuller reminds us of 
many more examples, such as constructive delivery in contract law. See, L. Fuller, supra note 131, 
at 15; and implied provisions in contracts. L. Fuller, Id, at 8.
240 Scores of studies were made on the nature of legal personality. For a handy bibliography of 
nineteenth-century foreign treatises, see Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 253, 
254 n.3 (1911); see, also, John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personalty, 
35 Yale L. J. 655 (1926); Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a 
Legal Fiction, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 563 (1987).
241 Maine, Ancient Law, in The problem of jurisprudence 371 (L. Fuller ed. 1946) (chapter reprints 
first half of H. Maine, Ancient law (1861)). In referring to the fictions of Roman law, and to some 
of the older, jurisdictional common law fictions, Maine wrote, "The fact is in both cases that the 
law has been wholly changed; the fiction is that it remains what it always was." Id. at 370. Pound 
was the most expansive of all, including in his definition of legal fiction interpretation, equity, and 
natural law. See, Pound, supra note 161, at 131; L. Fuller, Supra note 131, at 53.
242 L. Fuller, id, at 53.
243 Wilkinson, J. Harvie, supra note 161, at 907.
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245 Id, at 907, 908.
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Arguably, the time has come for theoreticians and policy makers alike to reevaluate the 
present anti-globalists and globalist paradigms of cyberspace and ultimately integrate 
territorial privacy to on-line privacy jurisprudence at large. Thus, the arguable 
recognition of on-line locales within their meaning in localist boundary theory, could still 
comply with physical world’s notion of geographic spatiality, it being a configuration of 
multiple physical locales, subject to a functional differentiation such as the public/private 
distinction.
C. A three criteria classification scheme:
A fiction or a presumption, if it is to escape the charge of ‘erroneous conclusion’ or ‘lie,’ 
must then comply with three requirements.246 First, it must be be based on an inference 
justified by common experience, based on absence of other proof and as drawn from 
available evidence.247 Second, it must be phrased in realistic terms; order, not an 
“inference”, but a disposition of the case in a certain contingency.248 Lastly, be freely 
rebuttable.249 This part will analyze these three conditions, while overcoming the 
constituting globalist and anti-globalist boundary claims in opposition to the possibility 
of legally acknowledging on-line locales in cyberspace.
1.         Based on an inference justified by common experience 
a) Absence of other proof 
The first among the two conditions a fiction or a presumption must be based on as an 
inference justified by common experience is that it has to be based on an absence of 
other proof.250 The lack of other proof does not have to be determined by the standard of 
certainty, but rather by a more relative test, known as the substantial-evidence test.251
Sometimes the reason for tolerating a gap either between evidence and findings or 
between findings and decision has to do with limitations of human intellects or 
limitations on the magnitude of investigations that may be conducted in particular 
circumstances. In application of this standard, courts have already acknowledged that 
based on what is known and uncontradicted by empirical evidence--may in and of itself 
be 'substantial evidence' when first-hand evidence on the question is unavailable. That 
is, even in an analogous concern to cyberspace’s spatial discourse, such as when 
upholding interstate commerce based on the evidential question of how electricity 
actually moves in a bus.252 In balance, though, not all propositions of fact that is useful 
and used in the administrative process are susceptible of proof with evidence.253
246 L. Fuller, supra note 131, at 45 et al.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 See, e.g., Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co., supra note 135, at. 465-466.
252 Id.
253 See, e.g., FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 209 n. 5, 84 S.Ct. 644, 647, 11 
L.Ed.2d 638 (1964); Travelers' Indemnity Co. v. Parkersburg Iron & Steel Co., 70 F.2d 63, 64 
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Overcoming the constituting globalist and anti-globalist boundary claims against the 
possibility of legally acknowledging on-line locales, is made here in two levels. A form 
of heterogeneity involving the requirement of a physical presence threatens the first 
weakness of the homogenous definition of space in its globalist boundary theory sense. 
Arguably, localist boundary theory may overcome the physical world’s wrong analogy 
upheld as scientific truism, which suggests that locales and the physical nexus of 
individuals to them most be physical.254 The second weakness of the homogenous 
globalist boundary sense that may overcome by a form of heterogeneity involves the 
concern over discontinuities in the ability to interact between other spaces, namely the 
physical world and among inner locations.255 Localist boundary theory applied through a 
legal fiction of an on-line locale may arguably entail the existence of relations between
locales – yet, without intrinsically involving geographical continuation, as will be 
explained herein.256
1) First heterogeneity: Physical presence
i. Non-physical locality 
Localist boundary theory is confronted with the wrong notion of the physical world that 
locales and the physical nexus of individuals to them must be physical. For a start, in 
regard to locales, we are told, although data has been traveling on wires and through the 
airwaves for centuries, the television, the telegraph, or the telephone are not "places" 
within which people travel.257 In analogy, to previous telecommunications networks, we 
are told, most Internet users access the Internet through a dial-up modem, converting 
digital data to analog sounds that can be sent over a telephone line just like the human 
voice.258 There were computer networks before the Internet that similarly relied on 
telephonic exchange of data.259 Based on what is also a common view among post 
modernistic critical geographers concerning the notion of virtual space, - Space is not a 
container but a medium, in which “Television space” is like “Cyberspace” – both don’t 
(1934); United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 191 F.2d 796, 808 (1951) aff'd, 345 U.S. 153, 73 
S.Ct. 609, 97 L.Ed. 918 (1953). See, also, 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1917--1929, 1976 (3d ed. 
1940 and Supp. 1970).
254 Thus, as explained in outset of part II, operationally, the extent of a territory can be defined by the 
set of points within it.  P. Haggett, supra note 126, at 40-55. In non-physical environments, 
political geography therefore allows us to uphold a one-point locale that, in essence, becomes non-
physical. The emphasis on physical presence naturally originates in the physical world’s 
application of localist boundary theory. See, Daniel A. Farber, supra note 44, at 1270; Soja, A 
paradigm, at 53. See, also, discussion, herein.
255 See, e.g., Hastings Donnan & Thomas M. Wilson, supra note 51, at 9.
256 Id.
257 Andrew L. Shapiro, The Control Revolution: How the Internet Is Putting Individuals in Charge 
and Changing the World We Know (1999), at 710-712 (cyberspace is not a real place but just a 
medium that we may control) [hereinafter, ‘Shapiro, The Control Revolution’]; Shapiro, The 
Disappearance of at 709 and see Fn. 21 & accompanying text; Timothy Wu, When Law & the 
Internet First Met, 3 Green Bag 2d 171 (1999-2000).
258 For a discussion of the prevalence of private “bulletin board systems” in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, see, e.g., Debra B. Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Call for a New First 
Amendment Standard, 9 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 87, 91-92 (1995).
259 Id.
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exist as spaces, but instead as communications mediums.260 Support for the physicality of 
locales, in fact, originates in public international law; which upholds that even the 
smallest ‘area of land’ must be ‘natural’ land as such that is capable of legal 
appropriation.261 To be capable of appropriation an island territory, in fact, must present 
at high tide a surface of land clear of the water, which is large enough to be habitable in 
practice.262 In resemblance to cyberspace scientific truism, this pragmatic notion of 
placeless seems to have led some public international law scholars in the physical world 
all the way to insist that the islands must also be shown on geographical maps.263
Adopting a not less pragmatic approach, however, the Anglo-American legal system, has 
consistently acknowledged alternative non-physical forms of discontinuous localized 
spatiality, and in various constitutional contexts. In seminal First Amendment cases such 
as Perry264 and Cornelius,265 in the course of declaring them non-public forums, court 
went on identifying the relevant locales as a school district's internal mail system and a 
charity fund drive among federal employees, respectively, notwithstanding that each 
"lacks a physical situs.”266 In another context, in United States v. Grace,267 the Court 
divided the Supreme Court grounds into perimeter sidewalks and interior grounds,268
relying on the sidewalks' functional continuity with the adjoining streets269 and 
indistinguishability from other public walkways.270 Constitutional criminal law also has 
transcended the notion that privacy is defined only by physical boundaries. In essence, 
the 'public sphere' refers not to a locale as such but to a fictitious sphere, in which a set of 
activities constitutes a democratic society's self-reflection and self-governance. In a 
public sphere, private persons come together to discuss, deliberate, and decide public 
questions. Recognition of a fictitious locale was instead made functional. Any remaining 
doubts that such a functionally defined locale could qualify as a public forum were 
dispelled in Rosenberger,271 where the Court characterized the university's student 
260 Shapiro, The Control Revolution, supra note 243 (for the legal perspective), at 710-712; Timothy 
Wu, supra note 243 (same). See, also, Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion 
of Space in Critical Social Theory (1989) (For the political geography perspective).
261 Article 121 of the Montego Bay Convention of 10 December 1982 uses a geological criterion, ‘a 
naturally area of land’. Artificial islands are indeed excluded. Even here, however, the debates at 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea revealed the great complexity of this 
alleged pragmatic legal interpretation of locales. Thus, the nature of the area of land, and therefore 
the ability to use it, matters little. ‘Mud, slit, coral, sand, madrepore, rocks, etc. anything makes an 
island’. See Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands 
(Kluwer law international, 1996), at 22, referring to Laurent Lucchini & Michel Voelckel, Droit de 
la mer, vol. I (Paris, Pedone, 1990), at 331.
262 International Court of Justice, 1953, at 49, 53.
263 See Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 247, at 22, referring to Gilbert Gidel, La mer 
territoriale at la zone contige, (1934) Recueil des Courts de l’Academie de Droit International, II, 
vol. 48, at 137-278.
264 Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
265 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
266 Id, at 801.
267 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
268 Id, at 179-80. 
269 Id, at 180. 
270 Id, at 179. 
271 Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
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activity funding system as "open[ing] a limited forum"272 and declared that "[t]he SAF is 
a forum….more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same 
principles are applicable”.273 With this jurisprudential shift in emphasis from what was, 
up till then, perceived as a classic physical analysis towards a more functional one –
locales are indeed apparent today as fora that do not always have to be physical gathering 
places.274
The notion of ‘territorial trap’ as posited by John Agnew has been an important statement 
in this respect. Agnew argues that territory, in its traditional fixed and finite sense as 
determined by rigid boundaries, should not be the focus for political geographical 
analysis. It is important not to fall into the trap of understanding territoriality as 
automatically entailing ‘the practices of total mutual exclusion which the dominant 
understanding of the territorial state attributes to it’.275 The legal concern revolving 
accessibility to locales would therefore be the question of where access can be allowed 
and what a would-be entrant can do with the information retrieved, instead of who should 
be eligible to access locales for collection purposes, as under- or over-inclusively 
permitted by their lawful owners. Whenever such functionally based analysis entails (and
only then), there must be no inherent objection to why should our legal system not 
fictitiously expand the notion of locales into other virtual realms, such as cyberspace. 
ii. Imperfect geographic nexus
The physical presence prerequisite has also been overcome in regard to the geographic 
nexus requirement. In the physical world, that predominantly has been the case in 
standing to sue in environmental and land use cases in the federal courts.276 Initially, in 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, for example, the Supreme Court required a 
“geographic nexus” between the injured plaintiff and the specific area endangered by 
272 Id, at 829. The Court uses the term "limited" or "designated" forum to denote a forum that, at least 
for a class of speech that may be limited by speaker and/or subject matter, will be treated as a 
"public forum." Id; ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). See infra Part II.A.2. 
273 Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, at 830.
274 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2517, 132 
L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (public place was regarded here in a “functional” form instead of a 
“geographic” one); See, also, Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 
727, 792 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
275 Newman, From Moribund Backwater, supra note 97, at 16, referring to J. Agnew & S. Corbridge, 
Mastering space: Hegemony, territory and international political economy (London: Routledge, 
1995), p. 79. Peter Tylor, as it relates to the state and the organization of non-physical power, also 
discusses the alternative understandings of territory, in his rejection of traditional physical notion 
of ‘territorial absolutism’. See, David Newman, at 16, Id, referring to P.J. Tylor, Territorial 
absolutism and its evasions, Geography research forum, 16.
276 The nexus requirement originated in Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See, also, United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973); See 
generally, also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, §§ 3-15 to -17 (3rd ed. 2000), 
and primarily § 3-17, at 392-424.
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agency action, even though the Court couched its argument regarding the nexus’s degree 
of specificity in terms of "actually affected, without exhausting the forms of causality to 
physical ones.277 In continuation, in its discussion of the requirement of injury in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court intimated that the degree of specificity of the 
nexus requirement can be satisfied in many non-physical forms of causation, by a direct 
link between one's demonstrated work with ("vocational nexus") or interest in an 
endangered animal ("animal nexus") or habitat ("ecosystem nexus") and an agency's 
pending action.278
Further non-physical expansion of the nexus’ specificity followed in Idaho Conservation 
League v. Mumma.279 Distinguishing the National Wildlife Federation's specificity
requirement, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs satisfied the “geographic nexus” 
requirement despite their inability to specify threatened areas because the proposed 
development areas had not yet been determined.280 In their dissent in Defenders, Justices 
Blackmun and O'Connor further espoused and advanced the ecosystem nexus theory, 
acknowledging "(m)any environmental injuries…cause harm distant from the area 
immediately affected by the challenged action… such as rivers running long geographical 
courses."281 Likewise, the dissent impliedly endorsed the "animal nexus" theory in 
stating, "Environmental destruction may affect animals traveling over vast geographical 
ranges."282 The imperfect nexus between geographically compact districts or locales and 
communities of interest was finally acknowledged in Prosser v. Elections Board,283 in 
which the district court adopted its own apportionment plan for Wisconsin. Judge Posner 
held there that there is not a complete correlation between geographical propinquity and 
community of interests.284 In support of this imperfect nexus-requirement the courts,  
instead, warns us against the possible results of rigid scientific truism, suggesting that the 
achievement of perfect contiguity and compactness would only imply ruthless disregard 
for other elements of homogeneity; and would require breaking up counties, towns, 
villages, wards, even neighborhoods.285 To conclude, with this jurisprudential shift in 
277 497 U.S. 871, 885-89 (1990). See, also, Sabine River Authority v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 951 F.2d 
at 675 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, (emphasis in original)). 
278 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2139-40 (1992).
279 956 F.2d 1508, 1517 (9th Cir. 1992); see National Wildlife Fed'n , 497 U.S. at 882.
280 Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma 956 F.2d 1508, 1517 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding a 
geographic nexus requirement in the Forest Service's). See, also, City of Los Angeles v. National 
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing that persons 
suing to enforce National Environmental Policy Act requirements must show a sufficient 
geographical nexus to the site of a challenged project).
281 Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2154.
282 Id. (citing, for example, Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986)).
283 793 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 1992). Id. at 861-62.
284 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1994).
285 Prosser, supra note 268, at 863. See, also, Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. 
Supp. 21, 28 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973)) 
(rejecting the Government's argument that "many of the alleged environmental effects of the 
NAFTA on the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (§ 101, 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1994)) are too 
widespread to be confined to a particular geographical location." In support, the district court held 
that "the absence of a geographic nexus does not defeat a claim of standing because that 'would 
mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by 
nobody"'), Id.
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emphasis from what was, up till then, perceived as a classic physical analysis towards a 
more functional one – locales and the physical nexus of individuals to them are indeed 
apparent today as interrelated fora that do not always have to be physical.
2) Second heterogeneity: Discontinuity
The second weakness of the homogenous definition of space in its globalist boundary
theory sense is threatened by a form of heterogeneity involving discontinuities in the 
ability to interact between other spaces, namely the physical world and among inner 
locations.286 From a legal perspective it entails the existence of relations between locales, 
yet without intrinsically involving geographical continuation.287 This lack of continuous 
homogeneity, ultimately, upholds the legal notions of territory and borders.288 Firstly, 
through the definition of territory - the political definition of a space that constitutes the 
core of geopolitical analysis.289 It also wove together areal and spatial analysis through 
the concept of a spatial system – a segment of space (real or hypothetical), which is 
formally and functionally organized through a patterning of attributes and a structuring of 
interactions. A system of settlements or central locales, for example, would consist of 
locations tied together by certain shared or complementary attributes (e.g., size, 
proximate location, types of services performed, socio-cultural features) and the 
structuring of interactions between them (e.g., flow of money, influence, people, goods 
and information).290 Secondly, borders are divided up by lawyers and geographers into 
the related concepts of boundaries and frontiers. More relevant to the easily demarcable 
potential locales in network environments - by IP addresses and gatekeeping technology, 
are boundaries (and thus boundary-making). These are the lines that demarcate territorial 
compartments, be they states, urban neighborhoods or group turfs, within which human 
activity takes place and is differentiated.291 By drawing boundaries around space 
286 See, e.g., supra note 51, at 9.
287 Id.
288 See, e.g., Hastings Donnan & Thomas M. Wilson, supra note 51, at 9.
289 Haggett goes further to offer two separate human spatial patterns in his discussion of movement in 
space. He distinguishes between “fields” with undefined and indeterminate boundaries, and 
“territories” with specific boundaries. P. Haggett, Locational analysis of human geography 
(London: Arnold, 1965), at 40-55. Thus, operationally, the extent of a territory can be defined in 
terms of control and occupancy, whereas field is defined in terms of movement, without the caveat 
of ownership. Id. In cyberspace, it is largely agreed that all websites (as potential locales) are 
owned, easily demarcable and thus, at least theoretically could be subjected to some level of 
control. They should, therefore, be more closely related to the analysis of territories than that of 
fields. See, also, discussion at Part III.C.2, infra.
290 Soja, A paradigm supra note 45, at 53.
291 Prescott, Political geography (Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1972), at 54, 61-74 [Hereinafter, ‘Prescott, 
Political geography’]; Suzanne Lalonde, supra note 124, at 8 and mentioned sources; J.R.V. 
Prescot, Political frontiers and boundaries (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), at 36 [Hereinafter, 
‘Prescot, Political frontiers’]; L.K.D Kristof, supra note 124, at 127; T. Cresswell, In place, out of 
place: Geography, ideology and transgression (University of Minnesota Press, 1996), at 149. In 
the physical world, with no appropriate analogy to network environments, Borderland is then ‘the 
transition zone within which the boundary lies’. See Prescot, Political frontiers supra note 124, at 
13-14. 
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considered theirs, people (and nations) strive to transform space into locales.292 Such 
boundaries are described in words or a treaty, shown on a map, or marked on the ground 
by physical indicators.293
In opposition to acknowledging both inner and outer borders in cyberspace, scientific 
truism largely upholds today that “in the strict technological sense”294 there is no 
empirical support for the spatiality paradigm,295 and courts, thus far, provided none.296
Instead, a number of courts have made the mistake of overlooking the differences 
between the Internet and real space in a variety of contexts, such as when the doctrine of 
trespass to chattels to email and Web site access was applied, while assuming inner
bordering.297 Whenever Internet trespass cases create this analogy, courts have in fact 
only made a mistaken conceptual leap, by assuming that Cyberspace is a place in its 
traditional physical sense.298 Neither, are we often told, is there empirical support for the 
notion of Cyberspace’s “separateness” through outer bordering from physical space.299
These observations are, nevertheless, minor from the individual’s perspective that entails 
human behavior which legal truth regulates, regardless of the choice of legal fictions, on 
two levels. First, already in the physical world, discontinuity is not an obstacle against the 
proprietariness concerning both the existence of proximity to locales upon their type and 
use. Notably, in public international law the history of claims of intrinsic sovereignty of 
national groups over island territories, the argument based on geographical proximity has 
never been recognized, as constituting a rule of international law in favor of the state 
whose territory lies closest to the disputed islands.300 In the physical world, these 
observations are also minor concerning the type and use of the neighboring locale. In 
292 Stanley Waterman, States of Segregation, 57-75, In Clive Schofield, David Newman, Alasdair 
Drysdale & Janet Brown (eds.), The Razor’s Edge: International Boundaries and Political 
Geography (Kluwer Law International, 2002), at 63.
293 Id.
294 Dan Hunter, supra note 43, at 472; Mark Lemley, supra note 43, id.
295 See, O'Rourke, Property Rights, at 592 and Fn. 62, referring to Robert G. Sachs, supra note 90, at 
1; Alfred C. Yen, western Frontier of Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 
17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1207 (2002), at 1216.
296 See, Dan Hunter, supra note 43, at 472; Mark Lemley, supra note 43. 
297 For courts applying the doctrine of trespass to chattels to the Internet, see, e.g., America Online v. 
National Health Care Discount, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Iowa 2001); Oyster Software, Inc. 
v. Forms Processing, 2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal. 2001); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 
F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 
1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), review 
granted, 43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002). For early use of the trespass doctrine to computers, see, e.g., 
People v. Versaggi, 83 N.Y.2d 123, 129 (1994) (noting the New York state legislation proscribing 
computer trespass, Penal Law § 156.10). But see Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 
99-7654, 2000 WL 525390 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000); Express One Int'l, Inc. v. Steinbeck, 53 
S.W.3d 895 (Tex. App. 2001).
298
 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 43 (criticizing the courts’ application of the cyberspace as place 
metaphor); O’Rourke, Analogy, supra note (criticizing courts for creating a broad property right 
on information for network environments), pp. 595-97; Burk, The Trouble With Trespass 
(criticizing courts ignoring the damage requirement of trespass to chattels to network 
environments), p. 34.
299 See, O'Rourke, Property Rights’, supra note 43, at 592 and Fn. 62, referring to Robert G. Sachs, 
supra note 90, at 1.
300 See Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 247, at 27-29 and Fn. 20-23 & accompanying text.
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fact, discontinuation between locales due to ‘spot zoning’ or a zoning ordinance, which 
creates a small island of property with restrictions on its use different from those imposed 
on the surrounding property, are part and parcel of land use.301 It is of social and private 
interest to the parties involved in its use, and whenever there is a reasonable basis to treat 
the spot-zoned property differently from the surrounding property, spot zoning is valid.302
Like in the physical world, on-line territorial privacy could be upheld in private locales 
that are spotted inside publicly owned locales, such as public telephone booth,303 women 
employees’ public restrooms owned by their employer304 or a public restroom in a 
skating ring.305 Arguably, there is no inherent justification to limit the recognition of 
discontinuity between fictional locales in cyberspace, where such have even less inherent 
physical constriction on access to present on-line locales, based on gatekeeping 
technology, and their use by users in the first place. 
Second, discontinuity can be overcome by localist boundary theory also based on 
analogous experience among network environments that predated cyberspace. In 
international monetary wiring networks, the format and order in which information is 
stored does not diminish its tangibility and logical retrieval, whenever it is assembled and 
presented to the user as cohesive essence. There as well, the appropriate nature of data 
storage is of marginal physical spatial relevancy. Instead, from the user’s perspective it is 
the interface through which data is accessed that is legally regulated, such as digitized 
money or other non-physical monetary rights. Both may be stored in one format, such as 
binary numbers that signifies a sum of money at a bank account, or a check legal 
obligation that is given in oral – but then accounted for per their interfacial appearance, 
which may then support functional discontinuity. In cyberspace, that interactive level of 
accessibility may, in fact, create a functional sense of distinguishable "placeness" that 
meetings in Cyberspace may become a viable alternative to meetings in physical space.306
That is, regardless of the format and order in which information is stored. In a less than a 
‘strict technological sense,’ legal truth already acknowledges that such normative 
discontinuities do not have to be inclusive in the cognitive sense; in fact, they can be
fictional.
There are however, a few indications that a shift toward localist boundary recognition of 
virtual discontinuity is at reach. As recently as 1997, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
"that the creation of such [adult] zones can be constitutionally sound”307 Instead of 
301 Little v. Winborn, Supreme Court of Iowa (1994) 518 N.W. 2d 384, referring to Jaffe v. City of 
Davenport, 179 N.W. 2d 554, 556 (Iowa 1970). See, also, 8 E. McQuillen, Municipal 
Corporations § 25.84, at 319 (3rd ed. Rev. 1991).
302 Little v. Winborn, Supreme Court of Iowa, Determining whether there is a reasonable basis for 
spot zoning, typically entails the consideration of the size of the spot zoned, the uses of the 
surrounding property, the changing conditions of the larger space, the use to which the subject 
property has been put and its suitability and adaptability for various uses, Id
303 Katz v. United States, supra note 41, Id.
304 Benitez v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 714 N.E.2d 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
305 Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
306 See, I. Trotter Hardy, Electronic Conferences: The Report of an Experiment, 6 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 
213, 232-34 (1993) (discussing the advantages of e-mail conferences) (Fn. 30) [Hereinafter, 
‘Hardy, Electronic Conferences’].
307 See, Reno v. ACLU, supra note 61, at 2354.
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relaxing the discontinuous localist spatial analogy with the prevailing technocentristic 
globalist types of argumentation that tell us that geography, ultimately, implies both 
discrete locales and an ability to map their organization in either relation to the physical 
world or in separation from it - the court understood that discontinuous zoning is more 
possible in Cyberspace than in other media, without adhering to a spatial relationship 
between all locales. That is, even in the midst of what the court identified as 
technological uncertainty concerning future zoning abilities, Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence suggested that the Court was sensitive not only to how the Internet differed 
from any of the existing media offered as analogies at the present time,308 but also to how 
the nature of the Internet might change over time in ways that affected its regulability.309
Almost anecdotally, recognition of the homogenous weakness concerning continuity, 
ultimately, can be found within Johnson and Post’s globalist argument. In fact, less 
attention has thus far given to the fact that Johnson & Post’s boundary approach, 
normatively accepts the possibility of inner bordering within distinct Cyberspace locales 
(or “constellations”310 or “areas”311).312 Each such virtual locale, as they normatively 
agree, could then likely develop its own set of distinct rules.313 Thus, as localist boundary 
theory predicts, conduct acceptable in one locale of cyberspace could then be fenced-out 
by another.314 Albeit, once again, based on a technocentristic approach, in due course, so 
does Johnson & Post’s approach could succumb to the prospect of localist discontinuity 
as much as technology allows.315 Thus, at least normatively, even Johnson and Post’s 
strong globalist advocacy recognizes that localist heterogeneity in continuity could be 
sustained.
b) Drawn from available evidence
1) Physical distance: Remote access
A second weakness of the homogenous definition of space according to globalist 
boundary theoreticians is threatened by heterogeneity due to the existence of distance316
308 Id, at 889-90 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
309 Id, at 890 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also Lawrence Lessig, supra note 68, at 886-89; 
Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, supra note 72; O’Connor’s concurrence has been criticized as a 
rote application of the cyberspace as place metaphor, however.  See Josh A. Goldfoot, supra note 
88, at 920-21.  
310 Johnson & Post, supra note 59, at 1379 and Fn. M92-96 and accompanying text.
311 Id.
312 In a conversation with David Post he further suggested that the ‘inner zoning’ argument should 
have been understood as even more acute that the more cited ‘outer zoning separateness’ argument 
vis-à-vis the physical world. (Interview with David Post 3/12/04). Post’s localist heterogeneous 
clarification, however, remains in tension with his main argument that views cyberspace as a 
global spatial system, regardless of its relation to the physical world spatiality.
313 Johnson & Post, supra note 59, at 1379.
314 Id, at 1379, 1396-1397.
315 In further continuation with localist theory, Johnson and Post accept that a primary function and 
characteristic of such cyber borders or boundaries is its ability to be perceived by the one who 
crosses it. See, Id, at 1379 and Fn. 33 & accompanying text. 
316 Legal appliance of localist boundary theory to the concept of distance has, notably, given rise to 
the concept of Frontiers. These are zones of varying depth, which marked either the political 
division between two countries or the division between the settled and uninhabited areas within a 
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and its influence on entry preferences on individuals.317 The presence of distance then 
assumes proportional proximity between locales, which then supports the preferences of 
either entering a given locale or otherwise observing it remotely.318 Scientific truism 
rejects the soundness of these localist boundary theory propositions for cyberspace on 
several levels. Firstly, we are told, whereas a physical locale assumes ability to enter it, 
network environments are said not to have that ability, as entering a web site is physically 
impossible. Instead, we are told, only a replacement of data exists.319 As Lemley all-
purposely suggests, courts have not understood that no one “enters” Web sites.320 Instead, 
relevant on-line trespass cases’ defendants merely send request for information to a web 
server, which the plaintiff had made open to the public, and the plaintiff’s own server 
sends information in return.321 Lemley further argues that the technological ability to 
sustain simultaneous usage through both multiple presences by one individual in various 
locales and multiple presences by various individuals in one locale – is unique to network 
environments and as such entails further spatial disparity from the physical world’s 
spatial analysis. To begin with, multiple entries/entrants is said to diminish the stability of 
locations.322 In addition, it is said to override passage scarcity, as for on-line
communications purposes bandwidth is effectively infinite.323 Secondly, in network 
environment observance is said to be impossible, as it lacks the concept of proportional 
proximity or “next door”.324 Thus, as scientific truism argues, there can be no non-
material public locales, such as streets or sidewalks, from which to observe on either
public or private spheres could be made possible.325
Analyzing localist boundary theory as legal truth may, however, lead us to different 
instrumental conclusions. In the absolute fictional sense in consideration of territorial 
privacy, as Robert Post points out, privacy "cannot be reduced to objective facts like 
spatial distance or information or observance; it can only be understood by reference to 
norms of behavior."326 Arguably, in the present case, scientific truism actually can be 
overcome partly from within cognition itself, as will be explained herein, so that the use 
of fiction not even indispensable. In the following regard it is the case that in some cases 
country. J.R.V. Prescott, Political geography, supra note 105, at 54, 56-61; Suzanne Lalonde, 
Determining boundaries in a conflicted world (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), at 8 and 
mentioned sources; L.K.D Kristof, The nature of frontiers and bounadies, In R.E. Kasperson & 
J.V. Minghi (eds.), The structure of political geography (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 127. Frontiers 
are of less importance to network environments, as will be explained herein.
317 J.R.V. Prescott, supra note 105, at 54, 56-61; Suzanne Lalonde, supra note 124, at 8 and 
mentioned sources; L.K.D Kristof, supra note 124, at 127. 
318 Id. 
319 Mark Lemley, supra note 43, Id; Shapiro, The Disappearance, at 710.
320 Id. See, also, See, Joseph M. Olivenbaum, Rethinking Federal Computer Crime Legislation, 27 
Seton Hall L. Rev. 574 (1997), at 577.
321 Mark Lemley, Id.
322 Id, at 526.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law 
Tort, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 957, 969 (1989). See, also, Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 
supra note 9, at 1129.
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legal fictions-far from being merely the metaphorical expressions of “norms” – are in fact 
tentative expressions of scientific truths, backed by legal values, to be discovered by the 
courts in their struggle to rationalize the subject matters presented to them.327 Based on a 
conventional framework of legal fiction of on-line locales, an applied localist boundary 
theory for cyberspace could then aggregately support the existence of heterogeneity due 
to the existence of distance and its influence on entry preferences on individuals. That is, 
for reasons deriving from an analogy to the physical world’s remote access and the added 
reverse remote access nature of cyberspace.
To begin with, in comparing non-physical electronic access to physical access there is 
still a sufficient level of scientific truth analogy that could permit us to overcome the 
obstacle set by this argument, in two levels. Firstly, the existence of non-physical entry 
should not be seen unique to network environments, and should be legally analogized to 
physical environments. In the latter, the requirement of actual trespass was largely
abandoned with the tort of privacy intrusion.328 Thus, the requirement of a tangible 
entrance has been relaxed almost to the point of being discarded. Thus, for example, a
single shot over private property was seen as trespass,329 and in different circumstances 
parents were liable to long-distance telephone company for trespass to personal property 
arising from their sons' unauthorized use of confidential codes to gain computer access to 
a company's system.330 Other courts have held that microscopic particles331 or smoke332
may give rise to trespass. And the California Supreme Court has intimated migrating 
intangibles (e.g., sound waves) may result in a trespass.333 More relevant to cyberspace’s 
digital setting was the precedent upholding that electronic signals were sufficiently 
tangible to support a trespass cause of action.334 Trespass analysis was not the only way 
through which Courts have overcome the physical presence and entry requirements. 
Thus, in a constituting set of Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) jurisdictional cases, as 
in the case of Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co.,335 the court has 
upheld that even a reaction up and down the line by a signal or a chain reaction is, in 
essence, electricity moving in interstate commerce.336 The Federal Power Commission 
327 Dean Pound, supra note 161, at 132.
328 Nevertheless, there are still some jurisdictions that still require actual trespass by the defendant 
See, e.g., Pierson v. News Group Publications, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635, 640 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
329 Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1922) (holding a 
single shot across private property is a trespass); Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 331-32 (Mont. 
1925) (holding that defendant while standing on another's property, committed a trespass when he 
fired a shotgun over plaintiff's premises).
330 Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, supra note 213, Id.
331 Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. (1985) 104 Wash.2d 677, 709 P.2d 782, 788-789.
332 Ream v. Keen (1992) 314 Or. 370, 838 P.2d 1073, 1075.
333 Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 32 Cal.3d at pp. 233-234, 185 Cal.Rptr. 280, 649 P.2d 922.
334 Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, supra note 213, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 Cal.App.4.Dist., 1996. See, also, 
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., SUPRA NOTE 213, at 1021 (stating that electronic 
signals or messages provide sufficient contact to give rise to action for trespass to chattels).
335 See, supra note 135, Id.
336 Id, at 458. See, also, Section 201 of the Federal Power Act owes its origin to the determination of 
this Court that a direct transfer of power from a utility in Rhode Island to a utility in 
Massachusetts is in interstate commerce, Id, at 458. See Public Utilities Comm'n v. Attleboro 
Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 47 S.Ct. 294, 71 L.Ed. 549 (1927). 'Part II (of the Act) is a 
direct result of Attleboro.' United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California, 345 U.S. 295, 
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court further argued, that no matter how small the quantity of the electromagnetic 
response, FPC jurisdiction will attach because it is settled that Congress has not 
'conditioned the jurisdiction of the Commission upon any particular volume or proportion 
of interstate energy involved, and we do not . . . supply such a jurisdictional limitation by 
construction.'337 Where previously the tort often required the tortfeasor's presence in the 
private space, the proposal allows the presence requirement to be fulfilled virtually, 
potentially expanding the tort of unreasonable intrusion to include peering into private 
locales by the gathering of information by private persons using sense-enhancing tools. 
In part, the tort of privacy intrusion may involve a purely sensory invasion by observing 
that an intrusion may be committed "by the use of the defendant's senses, with or without 
mechanical aids”338, used to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private affairs, such as by 
looking into her upstairs windows with binoculars.339 Thus, when a picture is taken of a 
plaintiff while she is in the privacy of her home, the taking of the picture may be 
considered an intrusion into the plaintiff's privacy just as remote eavesdropping or 
looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars are considered an invasion of her 
privacy.340 Overall, most courts today do not require the physical penetration of private 
locales as an ingredient of spatial invasion of privacy. Wiretapping, bugging rooms with 
microphones and peering into windows have all been held to constitute actionable 
intrusions.341 Based on several updates and expansions of the Wiretap Act, the ECPA, in 
fact, expanded the protection of privacy against remote access from wire communications 
also to electronic communications from unauthorized interception, use and disclosure. 342
Whenever taking a picture or taping someone may sometimes have captured the data 
subject’s privacy inside her locale by importing its content ours, assuming that we 
remained in ours in the first place. Still, we say that even without leaving our locale and 
only by the fact that we have captured data from another locale, without being there – we 
have intruded privacy by “uploading” that captured data to our locale. In comparison with 
the physical world, arguably, the right analogy to network environments should be with 
remote access instead of direct access, as in some analogous physical environments. 
Such is the case with surveillance into a private locale from a public one, where invasion 
311, 73 S.Ct. 706, 715, 97 L.Ed. 1020 (1953); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 
515, 65 S.Ct. 749, 89 L.Ed. 1150 (1945).
337 Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co., Id, at 461. See, also, Connecticut Ligh 
& Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 536, 65 S.Ct. 749, 759. See also Pennsylvania Water & Power 
Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414, 72 S.Ct. 843, 96 L.Ed. 1042 (1952).
338 See, Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 14, § 652B, Comment (b).
339 Id.
340 86 A.L.R.3d 374, supra note 16, § 3(A).
341 See, W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 15, § 117, at 854-55 (citing cases); See, Id. Some states 
have chosen to promote specialized types of privacy through targeted Anti-Paparazzi laws. See, 
e.g., California's anti paparazzi statute Cal. Civ. Code. § 1708.8(b) (West 1999).
342 Electronic communications differ from wire communications in that they are communications that 
are not transmitted by sound waves and cannot be characterized as containing a human voice. 
Instead, they include telegraph, telex communications, electronic mail, nonvoice digitized 
transmissions, and the portion of video teleconferences that do not involve the hearing of voice or 
oral sounds. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1988), supra note 23, Id.
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of privacy is done by technical surveillance that allows identification of a privacy subject 
matter.343 Cyberspace territorial privacy may arguably support an analogous proposition.
Alternatively, remote access can be made legitimate and thus has no intrinsic normative 
value, such as in the case of legitimate remote access from a private locale into a public 
one, where for instance, a naked woman is been observed with the use of binoculars and 
then identified while bathing at a public beach. In both types of activities, remote access 
is seen sufficient to define liability, without remote access to spheres carrying physical 
presence or an intrinsic normative value per se. This interpretative rule also logically 
overcomes the separate scientific truisms’ claim concerning multiple usages through both 
multiple presences by one individual in various locales and multiple presences by various 
individuals to one locale. Multiple usage as either static presence or entry is, therefore, 
not unique to of network environments. It should, accordingly, not remain an obstacle in 
the sustainability of non-physical entry per se in non-physical environments, such as 
cyberspace.
In essence, the concept of territorial privacy is employed to govern the conduct of 
individuals who intrude in various ways upon one's life on-line. Privacy in these non-
physical contexts can be generally understood in its familiar informational sense;344 it 
limits the ability of others to gain, disseminate, or use information about oneself.345 Like 
in the physical world, in cyberspace, any gateway technology that would be seen as a 
public locale would avoid the risk of such illegal intrusion to whichever Internet user who 
will decide to enter it upon primer notice and choice to do so. Otherwise, for private 
locales on-line, namely – private proprietary web sites that would be acknowledged as 
such, intrusion into a user’s private affairs would be seemed illegally intrusive.
2) Non-physical distance: Reverse remote access
Secondly, and more specifically, this scientific truisms’ argument can be mitigated by the 
unique nature of network environments per se. Whereas in the physical world the 
embedded assumption for any proof of the occurrence of entry is the space-shifting of 
relevant individuals through direct access, and only alternatively through remote access –
a more particular type of space-shifting should be admitted in relation to cyberspace, 
namely reverse remote access. Technically, when a user clicks on a link, the user's 
computer sends a request to the server on which the desired document resides. That 
computer decides whether or not to respond favorably to the query.346 It honors the 
343 See, e.g., Ass'n Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Miller v. Brooks, 
472 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. App. 1996); Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. App. 2001).
344 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1989), p. 740.
345 Id.
346 The collection of uncopyrighted identifiable data is not an act of unauthorized copying and would 
not be subject to the preemption section. Moreover, the assumption of both a permissible access 
and the use of temporary copyrighted ‘work of art’ files, in their meaning in the Copyright Act, 
might override copyright preemption claims. In short, only when neither assumption applies in the 
case of copyrighted information, would the Copyright Act be the exclusive rule of decision under 
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request by sending a copy of the document to the user's computer, while the original 
remains on its server. In other words, the user who clicks on a link starts a chain of events 
that uses resources of either her system and those of the linked system. Commentators 
sometimes refer to this process as employing "pull" technology: The user "pulls" a copy 
of desired content from the linked site rather than having that site's server "push" content 
indiscriminately to the user who may or may not be interested in it.347 This type of 
information transaction from a given on-line locale to a user’s computer may 
allegorically remind us of the popular Arab idiom, suggesting “If Muhammad cannot go 
to the mountain, let the mountain come to Muhammad”. In both cases, space-shifting 
should then be considered functionally (and to some also theologically) appealing. Thus, 
whenever access to a given web page is made, an ISP sends the content of the requested 
data to the requesting user, and allows the latter to copy the content of that page as a 
temporary file.348 Thus, instead of users moving between locales remotely, the locales 
move between the users remotely, and information gathering is done, therefore, in the 
opposite order, but nevertheless remotely. As a result, allowing users to search for and 
retrieve of information stored in remote computers, as was also acknowledged as obiter 
dictum by the Reno v. ACLU court.349 Once the physical space-shifting requirement is 
inherently removed, remote access should be acknowledged in either direction. Only, as 
explained, in cyberspace access is made remotely but in the opposite direction; or 
otherwise, intrusion into our computers and observance of our digitized identities is 
practiced by locales, or some electronic parts of it, upon our earlier request. 
Thirdly, it should be reminded that the tort of intrusion only imposes liability for the use 
of one's senses if that person is using them in locales where she should not be. 
Eavesdropping, for instance, is thus allowed in a public locale. In Nader v. General 
Motors350 the Court stated that the mere observation of the plaintiff in a public locale 
does not amount to an invasion of the data subject’s privacy."351 As comment c to § 652B 
of the Restatement explains, a person who moves about in a public locale has emerged 
its preemption section. See, also, I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 
1996 J. Online L. art. 7, §§ 10, 3.
347 Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1148 (2000) (explaining that surfing the Web is 
a common example of pull technology); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, Bidder's 
Edge, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-15995) (9th Cir. filed 
June 22, 2000) (discussing "pull" technology and noting that "servers on the Internet are passive 
and do not deliver information to a consumer's computer unless that information is requested"). 
The author provided comments on and signed this brief in support of Bidder's Edge, Inc. She 
received no compensation for this activity.
348 Storing a Web page in a cache constitutes copying. See, also, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Advanced Computer Services v. MA Systems 
Corp., 845 F.Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994). See, also, Raymond T. Nimmer and Patricia Ann 
Krauthaus, Copyright on the Information Superhighway: Requiem for a Middleweight, 6 Stan L & 
Policy Rev 25 (1994), p. 32 et al. 
349 See, generally, ACLU v. Reno, supra note 61, at 834-36 (specifying remote information retrieval 
as one of the common methods of communication on the Internet).
350 See, 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
351 Id, at 771.
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from seclusion and thus opened herself up to observation by others.352 However, under 
certain circumstances, surveillance may be so 'overzealous' as to render it actionable.353
Thus, this general principle should not be understood to mean that all things that transpire 
in public are fair game for inquiry. In balance, as in the physical world, in the absence of 
a purposeful effort by some entity or device to actually track the actions of a particular 
individual, we would probably not consider social observation a form of monitoring.354
Thus, legitimate observation should not reveal information that people wish to hide.355
The court in Nader established that "[a] person does not automatically make public 
everything he does merely by being in a public place."356 This conclusion should still be 
held valid when entry is done non-physically, as in cyberspace; and any recognition of
remote entry should be done within this normative framework. In fact, in cyberspace, on-
line anonymity is easily established and is relatively cheap to achieve. Moreover, just like 
in the physical world, such identifiers are words or symbols, which identify a specific 
person. Examples of identifiers in their meaning at the ECPA include Internet customer's 
name, address, social security number, credit card number, and proof of Internet 
connection obtained by Internet providers.357 As a result, observance and knowledge of a 
person’s data identifiers - should remain a distinctive criterion in assessing privacy 
invasion on-line, even after territorial privacy is successfully integrated into cyberspace’s 
privacy jurisprudence. 
More particularly, on-line territorial privacy also should not alter the explicit premise in 
Dean Prosser's statement, adopted by the comments to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts,358 that there is no difference between merely observing a person in a public locale 
and taking her photograph. Thus, in correspondence to the physical world, activities like 
wiretapping and broadcasting without identifying, based on material that was gathered in 
352 Upheld also in, Dickson v. American Red Cross Nat. Headquartes, 1997 WL 118415, 
N.D.Tex.,1997 (motion for summary judgment granted) referring to K- Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 
v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
353 Dickson v. American Red Cross Nat. Headquartes, Id (citing Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 132 S.E.2d 119 (1963)).
354 Marc Rotenberg, supra note 194, at 22
355 See also Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 14, at § 652B cmt. c ("Even in a public place,
however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that 
are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is 
intrusion upon these matters.").
356 Nader v. General Motors, at 771. ("[T]he mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not give anyone 
the right to try to discover the amount of money he was withdrawing.), Id. One commentator has 
posited that the current formulation of the tort of intrusion does not extend protection to intrusions 
in public places, and that no case has ever expressly held otherwise. See, Andrew Jay McClurg, 
supra note 14, at 1085-86 (1995). 
357 18 U.S.C.A., supra note 23, §§ 2510-2711. See, also, John M. Carroll, Confidential Information 
Sources: Public & Private 10 (2d ed. 1991), at 11-12. Raymond Nimmer mentions also specific 
individual's eligibility for government benefits; qualifications for employment; criminal records; 
draft records; real estate transactions; marriage; birth and death records; automobile registration; 
and tax liability. See, Raymond T. Nimmer, The Law of Computer Technology P 13.07 (2d ed. 
1992), sec. 16.09.
358 Page Keeton et al, supra note 15, s 117, at 855-56; Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 14, 
sec. 652B cmt. C. 
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a public locale should not amount to intrusion upon seclusion.359 That legal framework 
should now also legitimize on -line non-identifiable data collection, for purposes such as 
for research on socio-economical trends or the development of statistics found in public 
locales, either through real time observance or ‘sensor technology’ or just occasional 
observance of user’s behavior in on-line public locales.360
Even more so, like in the physical world, mere observation and/or legitimate data 
collecting should then be legalized notwithstanding if the collection of observed data was 
made for commercial use or not. The physical world’s law already admits such 
circumstances. For example, in the case of Deteresa v. American Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc.361 Court upheld that under California law, a television producer's 
conduct in arranging for surreptitious videotaping of a woman in public view by camera 
person in public place, and in broadcasting only a five-second clip of tape, without 
broadcasting the woman's name or address, had insubstantial impact on privacy interests, 
and would not support the woman's intrusion into a seclusion privacy claim.362
Accordingly, it is uniformly held that the use of a photograph of a person's property does 
not constitute an invasion of that person's privacy justifying recovery unless that person's 
identity is apparent from the photograph.363 In other words, invasion of privacy by taking 
someone’s picture, even for commercial use, is possible unless the picture tells the 
person’s identity.364 Such as when a photograph of her property has been used by the 
defendant in an advertisement, the plaintiff's identity must be apparent in the photograph. 
2. Phrased in realistic terms
a.  Implicit individual consent
Within localist boundary theory, recognition of a distinct legal status of locales requires 
that individual consent and cost of control should match the particular functions on the 
whole sub segment of types of locations, namely private and public. A legal fiction of on-
line locales can arguably be easily phrased in realistic terms in compliance with both 
conditions. For a start, it could allow individual implied consent to on-line data 
collection. In public locales, Dean Prosser's conclusion that there can be no intrusion in a 
public locale depends upon the acceptance of two supporting premises, one implicit and 
one explicit. The implicit premise is that one assumes the risk of public inspection when 
she ventures into a public place.365 This assumption of risk analysis is clearly discernible 
359 Restatement (Second) of Torts, Id, § 652B.
360 T. Nimmer, supra note 333, sec. 16.09. For such important web-based applications, such as 
telemedicine, data visualization, data-mining, and distance learning, see, e.g., CITRIS.Net 
projects, available at: http://citris.ucdavis.edu/citrisnet.html, or Continuous Output and Navigation 
Technology with Refinement On-Line (CONTROL) projects, available at: 
http://control.cs.berkeley.edu:8000/control/.
361 See, 121 F.3d 460, C.A.9 (Cal.), 1997.
362 Id.
363 Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 14, § 652B.
364 See, also, John M. Carroll, supra note 333, at. 11-12.
365 Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 14, § 652B.
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in Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,366 a famous privacy case relied upon by Dean Prosser as 
support for his comments regarding absence of privacy in public locales.367 The court 
grounded much of its reasoning in a kind of assumption of risk analysis, commenting that 
the plaintiffs were "in a pose voluntarily assumed in a public market place";368 that they 
"had voluntarily exposed themselves to public gaze in a pose open to the view of any 
persons who might then be at or near their place of business";369 that "[b]y their own 
voluntary action plaintiffs waived their right of privacy so far as this particular public 
pose was assumed";370 and that the plaintiffs' right of privacy ceased by "their own 
voluntary assumption of this particular pose in a public place."371
In private locales, however, as the Restatement provision initially recognizes, to find true 
consent, the plaintiff must have full knowledge of the risk and voluntarily choose to 
encounter it. For an Internet customer to have reasonable expectation of privacy in her 
personal information under risk-analysis approach to Fourth Amendment:372 (1) data 
must not be knowingly exposed to others,373 and (2) Internet service provider's ability to 
access data must not constitute disclosure.374 That expectation of privacy, as explained, 
can be applied to private locales intruded by private data collectors. Moreover, like in the 
physical world, when an on-line business is available to the public, a would-be entrant to 
the on-line locale in a given web site, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, 
would have the implied consent of the owner to be there, and so long as the person 
engages in no acts inconsistent with the purposes of the business or locale, there would be 
no trespass.375
Practically, should the courts choose this path based on on-line territorial privacy and the 
following construction of on-line locales, affected website owners would be prohibited 
from freely disclosing their members' identities on the one hand, and relieved from the 
need to attest contractual consent in both types of locales and, arguably, should only be 
required to give adequate notice. As already acknowledged by the FTC, the notion that 
choice should be respected is almost universally accepted as a starting point for practical 
reasoning for privacy regulation.376 Such an invitation, however, presupposes that the 
366 See, 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953).
367 Prosser, supra note 9, at 391 n.81.
368 Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., supra note 342, at 444. 
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 Assumption of risk is then an affirmative defense that could be used by data collectors in 
cyberspace to claims based upon negligent or reckless conduct of their part. See, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts , supra note 14, sec. 496A.
373 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
374 Id, § 496C(1).
375 See Mosher v. Cook United, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 720, 721 (Ohio 1980) (labeling a comparison price 
shopper a "business invitee" subject to the property owner's right to revoke the shopper's license at 
will); 25 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass §48 (1989 & Supp. 2000).
376 Gavison, supra note 1, p. 441; The FTC has interpreted the norm of choice so as to include making 
a choice among a number of alternatives. See, FTC, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (1998), 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf>, at 17.
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conduct of would-be entrants will be in keeping with the nature of the locale.377 In a 
zoned cyberspace, boundaries would, then, serve as signposts that provide warning that 
we will be required, after crossing, to abide by different privacy rules. Thus, a link to a 
notification about information collection or a built-in disclaimer into the website’s locale, 
or several locales, would have to appear in response to every search or directory listing 
that included the target. It would also have to attract the attention of a user seeking a 
specific address out of a potentially long list of related sites. Thus, all that would actually 
be required is the insertion of a command into the Web page that opens a page 
maintained by the access-seeker on her own server as a separate window or built-in 
disclaimer into the website’s locale or several locales, in the visitor's browser.378
Like with other precise legal fictions, the risk of over inclusive distinction between 
locales through the simple measurement of disclaimers therefore may entail a regulatory 
paradox. The more it continues to strive to grasp and define the essence of a legal 
proposition, such as the existence of on line spatiality, the farther we may get to promote 
its declared legal purposes. Courts should initially confine themselves to determining 
whether the law and justice require or permit a change in the status quo. To decide, courts 
should look to what practices, policies, procedures, and agreements exist in the locale that 
may or may not create a reasonable and legally enforceable expectation of privacy.379 In 
information privacy cases, in analogy, courts have found that when employees used a 
lock, password, or encryption to protect certain items, that action created an “expectation 
of privacy” that could be violated when companies break the lock, password or 
encryption.380 A similar comparison could be made by courts to territorial privacy with 
users act to hide non-identifiable data upon entry to public locales. Upon entry to private 
locales, moreover, website owners may legitimize their collection activities, upon notice, 
clarifying that the web site owner collecting such data may override identity concealment 
measurements used by would-be entrants to such locales.381
b.  Proportional cost of control
Recognition of distinct locales also requires that the cost of control should match the 
particular functions on the whole sub segment of types of locations, namely private and 
377 See, Mosher v. Cook United, supra note 351, at 721; 25 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass, supra note 351, 
§48.
378 Using JavaScript, the following would open a window titled "CyberSidewalk" at the site 
www.sidewalkspeaker.org: <SCRIPT> CyberSidewalk=window.open 
("http://www.sidewalkspeaker.org")</SCRIPT>. A Web page can be broken down into the 
information transmitted by the web server and the resulting translation achieved by the browser 
software. Thus, the static "page" that one sees on the monitor is achieved by the browser's 
response to a series of instructions contained in the Hypertext Markup Language ("HTML") 
"page" transmitted by the server. See JavaScript Guide 
<http://developer.netscape.com/docs/manuals/communicator/jsguide4/index.htm>; An Exploration 
of Dynamic Documents, <http://home.netscape.com/assist/net_sites/pushpull.html>.
379 Sharon K. Black, supra note 34, at 315 (applying this proposition to the information privacy 
category).
380 Id, at 315 and Fn. 195 & accompanying text.
381 Id.
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public. Based on information privacy analysis, the legal problem has been likely to be 
detection of "trespasses" or the unauthorized use of an informational work.382 As noted 
earlier, practical problems exist with policing very long borders of real property, but they 
seem to pale beside the problem of detecting "trespass" activities like unauthorized 
copying or uses of informational works.383 If these costs are excessive in cyberspace, they 
might argue against a private-property regime because such a regime would not be 
"worth it".384
Based on an acknowledgment of territorial privacy, however, there should be a difference 
between control over content use as assessed through information privacy protection, and 
control over access. As explained, territorial privacy would only need to uphold sufficient 
control over access. Even when control over access derives from ownership, the law 
generally gives owners of real property the right to exclude others from entrance, 
regardless of whether or not the intruder causes harm.385 Thus, the doctrine of trespass to 
chattels traditionally required actual harm to the chattel, while trespass to land was 
actionable whether or not the owner's interest in the land was injured.386 A similar 
presumption to that of trespass to land, however, exists in case of privacy invasion 
according to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Invasion is intrinsically foul, even with 
no harm, as it is an “interference tort”, as opposed to a “damage tort” where the proof of 
harm is necessary following the proposition of "no harm, no foul."' Gavison further 
argues that in terms of social norms, privacy "is simply a conclusion, not a tool to analyze 
whether a certain invasion should be considered wrong in the first place."387 In other 
words, an intrusion on privacy is intrinsically harmful because it is defined as that which 
injures social personality.388 Thus, the tort of invasion of territorial privacy is 
qualitatively similar because the injury at issue is logically entailed, rather than merely 
contingently caused, by improper conduct.389
In contrast to the usual cause of action for negligence, this privacy tort enables a plaintiff 
to make out her case without alleging or proving any actual or contingent injury, such as 
emotional suffering or embarrassment.390 With this lowered standard of proof of 
infringing behavior, and by analogy, website owners should have the right to exclude 
others from gaining access to their information on a territorial basis, even if their entry 
382 Trotter Hardy, supra note 43, at 247.
383 Id.
384 Id. See, also, David McGowan, Website access: The case for consent, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 341 
(2003), at 373 (for a utilitarian analysis of on-line access policy).
385 For the context of trespass – See, Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 14, § 218 cmt. e 
(1965). See, also, Page Keeton et al, supra note 15, at 67 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) 
(outlining the historical cause of action in trespass). 
386 Id. For the context of trespass analysis in cyberspace, see, also, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 304 
(Cal. 2003) ("[w]hile one may have no right temporarily to use another's personal property, such use is 
actionable as a trespass only if it 'has proximately caused injury"' to the property in question") Hamidi, 
71 P.3d at 306 (quoting Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 1996))); Dan 
L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 27, 48-49 (2000).
387 Gavison, supra note 1, at 426 n. 18.
388 Id.
389 Robert C. Post, supra note 302, at 964; Gavison, supra note 1, at 425-40.
390 Robert C. Post, Id.
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does not harm the site in any way.391 Consequently, privacy norms against intrusion 
could be more upheld in cyberspace, especially given the fact that surveillance 
technology only makes illegal collection of information easier and cheaper to attain.
Notably, in tort law, full level of control by owners is only required in private locales. 
Alternatively, any lack of sufficient level of actual control does not negate the concept of 
spatiality at large, but rather only the possibility that such locale may be constituted as a 
private one. Like in physical world jurisprudence, virtual spatiality framed as public, may 
still be upheld.392 In such cases, the legal standard for spatiality could still constitute an 
on-line public locale, just like in the physical world. 
3. The presumption has to be either 
a) Conclusive, or 
b) Freely rebuttable
Presumptions or legal fictions of on-line locales can be made either conclusive or 
rebuttable. First, and proper to the legal fiction of on-line locales, they should be made 
conclusive presumptions, which are actually a substantive rule of law.393 Conceptually, 
following Gray’s classification scheme of legal fictions, borrowed from Ihering, legal 
fictions, in fact, are broken down into "historic," or procedural, fictions and "dogmatic" 
fictions.394 Accordingly, dogmatic fictions should never be used, as the historic fictions 
were used in the past, to change the law, but only for the purpose of classifying 
established rules, such as the existing private/public distinction between locales in the 
physical world. In that regard, the legal fiction of on-line locales should merely be 
regarded applicative and a direct and inevitable continuation of locales in the physical 
world. One should, consequently, be able to state the real doctrine for which they 
stand.395 Ultimately, the legal necessity for an adequate technical vocabulary makes it 
desirable that well-founded fictions such as, arguably, on-line locales – converted into 
legal truth, would be picked with appropriate judicial discretion.396
Regulators should be attentive to the reality that like other legal fictions, on-line locales 
are founded in part upon exceptionally strong and visible policies, which have been said
391 O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition, supra note 43, at 587; For the difference between 
“damage” torts and “interference” torts, see Robert Post, supra note 302, at p. 964 and Fn. 42 & 
accompanying text.
392 See, e.g., See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal.4th 200, 232 (1998) (holding that 
filming a rescue attempt at an accident scene, 50-feet down an embankment of an interstate 
highway, was not an invasion of plaintiff's privacy); upheld also in Salazar v. Golden State 
Warriors, 2000 WL 246586, N.D.Cal.,2000. There, the California Supreme Court has stated there 
is no invasion of privacy into a private sphere where plaintiff had no actual control of the premises 
where the incident took place, consequently upholding the default existence of a public sphere.
393 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 239, at § 2492 (3d ed. 1940); C. McCormick, Evidence § 342 at 804 (2d 
ed. 1972).
394 J. Gray, The nature and sources of law 30-37 (1921).
395 Id, at 37.
396 L. Fuller, supra note 131, at 23.
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to persist despite proof rebutting their factual basis.397 That is also why the other type of 
presumption, namely – the rebuttable presumption should not be preferred in the 
construction of on-line locales. Rebuttable presumptions are instead, rules of law that 
attach to proven evidentiary facts and certain procedural consequences as to the 
opponent’s duty to come forward with other evidence.398 As explained, communication 
mediums such as cyberspace are not susceptible to the possibility of rebutting physical 
spatiality, as such is not assumed to be present in the first place. As a result, on-line 
locales should not be seen as an “inference”, or dissimilarity, which is subtle but not 
unreal. As unreal constructions, on-line locales are not a conclusion which the [trier of 
fact] is permitted, but not compelled, to draw from the facts.”399 Instead, as real 
presumptions, also called presumptions of law, on line locales should be made an 
inference, through which the law directs the [trier of fact] to functionally draw if it finds a 
given set of justifications, as explained. The content of such on-line locales would then 
serve policy makers to specifically distinguish on-line public locales from the present 
unbalanced default mosaic of on-line private allotments. Public locales could then be held 
conclusive for newsgroups,400 in pre-print archives of articles enabling scientists to share 
the latest learning in their fields,401 web resources on the poster's favorite topic,402 etc. 
397 C. McCormick, Evidence § 345 at 822-823 (2d ed. 1972).
398 Olin Guy Wellborn III, The rules of evidence: Cases and materials (West, 2000), p. 553.
399 Bray v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 136, 140, 306 F.2d 743, 747 (1962).
400 See, e.g., Slashdot, at http://slashdot.org
401 See Los Alamos Physics Preprint Server, at http://www.arxiv.org
402 See, e.g., Archinect: Architectural and Urban Planning Sites, at http://www.archinect.com
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VI.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Thus far, cyberspace has not been left with a public sphere and locales, nor has a 
balanced privacy policy been established. Instead, only a private, and too wide, privacy 
legal rule has been adopted. Thus, database protection against the various forms of 
information collection, but particularly registration data that is collected upon initial entry 
to databases, is arguably an overly generalized privacy category. It includes both possible 
public and private on-line locales, while overly protecting the former.
This study shows that notwithstanding information or database privacy jurisprudence, 
territorial privacy and private and public locales, more specifically, could coexist on the 
Internet, just as they do in the physical world. In continuation to previous jurisprudential 
developments, privacy should continue to be valued instrumentally. Courts may then be 
required to differentiate and identify private locales and then fence them out from public 
ones. Thus, a legal fiction of on-line locales should now be constructed for cyberspace’s 
overall privacy policy.403
In public locales, privacy protection should instead be balanced with protecting legitimate 
observance and non-identifiable data collection either directly (collecting registration and 
transactional data) or indirectly (collecting clickstream data) by websites. Notably, with 
regard to databases, much information collection and use, occurs in what would 
otherwise be considered public, and as argued, many parts of cyberspace may well be 
considered public locales. In balance, adaptation of ECPA’s “in storage” definition in 
Title II, primarily, to territorial privacy would then enhance the protection given to 
information collected in private locales. 
Moreover, database protection falls short in applying information privacy whenever an 
otherwise potential locale would include multiple databases. Identifying such databases 
as private or public locales, therefore, also may avoid over fragmentation of these 
regulatory subject matters. Indeed, for the physical world, courts accepted claims 
involving territorial intrusion whenever the category of privacy that would likely be 
infringed was made in databases and would therefore belong to the category of 
information privacy.
In cyberspace, nonetheless, the U.S. federal government and primarily the FTC’s privacy 
policy, in fact, still encourages the withdrawal of law as a balancing constraint, as seen 
with the FTC's stance toward online privacy, which emphasizes technological and market 
self-regulation jointly, for the adoption of privacy policies. As shown, however, 
technology alone thus far, has failed to provide protection comparable to that, which 
could be provided with the intervention of law. Technology, thus fat, has been incapable 
of establishing a comprehensive boundary solution only by itself.
403 See e.g., Andrew L. Shapiro, supra note 42 (in justification of the 1st Amendment "public forum” 
doctrine); David J. Goldstone, supra note 43, at 3 (same).
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A legal fiction of on-line locales, in balance, can arguably be easily phrased in realistic 
terms in compliance with all-purpose territorial privacy protection. For a start, it could 
allow individual implied consent to on-line data collection. That expectation of privacy, 
as explained, can be further applied to private locales. Moreover, like in the physical 
world, when an on-line business is open to the public, a would-be entrant to the on-line 
locale in a given web site, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, would have 
the implied consent of the owner to be there, and so long as the person engages in no acts 
inconsistent with the purposes of the business or locale, there would be no illegal 
intrusion.
More particularly, territorial privacy on-line should also not alter the explicit premise in 
Prosser's statement, adopted by the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,404
that there is no difference between merely observing a person in a public locale and 
taking her photograph. Thus, in correspondence with the physical world, activities like 
wiretapping and broadcasting without identifying, based on material that was gathered in 
a public locale should not amount to intrusion upon seclusion. As shown, that legal 
framework should now also legitimize on-line non-identifiable data collection, for 
purposes such as for research on trends or the development of statistics in public locales,
either through real time observance sensor-based technology or just occasional 
observance of user’s behavior in public locales on-line.
Even more so, just like in the physical world, mere observation and/or legitimate data 
collecting in on-line locales should then be seen legal notwithstanding if the collection of 
observed data was made for commercial use or not. The physical world’s law already 
admits such circumstances. As a practical matter, observance in private locales should be 
replaced through a mechanism of voluntary disclosure of whichever types of information, 
namely, transactional, registration and clickstream data, that would be abided to by 
would-be entrants; in public locales, however, observance should be freely allowed, as 
long as a notice of the public locale is brought forth, but then be solely restricted to the 
collection of non-identifiable registration and clickstream data.
In balance, legitimate observation should not reveal data identifiers that people wish to 
hide. Like in the physical world, such identifiers are words or symbols, which identify a 
specific person. Examples of identifiers in their meaning at the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act include Internet customer's name, address, social security 
number, credit card number or proof of Internet connection obtained by Internet 
providers. As a result, observance and knowledge of a person’s data identifiers - should 
remain a distinctive criterion in assessing privacy invasion on-line, even after territorial 
privacy is successfully integrated into cyberspace’s privacy jurisprudence. This 
conclusion should still be held valid when entry is made non-physically, as in cyberspace; 
and any recognition of remote entry should be evaluated within this normative 
framework. 
404 Page Keeton et al, supra note 15, s 117, at 855-56; Restatement (Second) of Torts , supra note 14, 
sec. 652B cmt. c.
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Moreover, any lack of sufficient level of actual control should not negate the concept of 
spatiality at large, but rather only the possibility that such spatial location may be 
constituted as a private sphere. Notably, in tort law, full level of control by owners is only 
required in the private sphere. Like in physical world jurisprudence, a lesser level of 
control in virtual spatiality framed as a public sphere may still be upheld. In such cases, 
the legal standard for spatiality could still constitute an on-line public sphere. 
As real presumptions, also called presumptions of law, on line locales should be made an 
inference, through which the law directs the [trier of fact] to functionally draw if it finds a 
given set of justifications, as explained. The content of such locales would serve policy 
makers to specifically distinguish public locales from the present unbalanced default 
mosaic of on-line private allotments.
Like in the physical world, ultimately, on-line public locales will finally legitimize the 
supervision of public health, a territorially based collection of taxes, the enforcement of 
the criminal and First Amendment policies and even the possible use of copyrighted 
information distributed through the public sphere. That is, either if ownership of public 
locales is public, private or a combination of the two.
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